I've looked at Judith McGaw's "Early American Technology"(1994). In one chapter, she gives the result of a carefully designed probate survey of the Mid-Atlantic region. Survey looked at probate records in the 1700s for 5 rural counties in New Jersey and Pennsylvania -- chosen to catch the westward expansion. Counties were Hunterdon and Burlington Counties in New Jersey ( near Trenton and Philadelphia), York and Adams Counties in central Pennsylvania, and Westmoreland County in western Pennsylvania. In the case of York/Adams counties, she examined all probate records from 1700 to 1789. In the other three counties, she examined all probate records from 1700 to 1799. Total number of estates were 350.

On page 332, Judith McGaw indicates that her data shows about 60 percent of households in frontier areas owned firearms versus about 50 percent of the households in longer-settled areas. This is much higher than the 14-15% that Bellesiles gives on page 13 and page 445 of Arming America, even though two of the counties (Westmoreland, PA and Burlington,NJ) were also in Bellesiles's survey (note at bottom of page 445. Note that McGaw's total sample size is smaller than Bellesiles because it is limited to rural areas in a specific geographic region. It's too bad that Bellesiles notes were lost in the flood -- it would have been interesting to compare his results for the two common counties with those McGaw found. (McGaw indicates that she keeps her data in a detabase for processing and analysis.) I wonder if Bellesiles cross-checked his results with those obtained by McGaw and other historians (i.e.,for data they had obtained on firearms possession from their probate surveys?)

Several people have already noted one limitation of a probate survey -- it does not catch the common event where an elderly man gives his firearms to younger male relatives. I would note that it also does not catch another common event: where an elderly person sells his firearm because he needs money and his gun is valuable property he no longer needs. Social Security didn't exist in the 1700s and 1800s.

Has anyone read Judith McGaw's "Early American Technology" ?? I haven't yet but plan to do so shortly. The 1995 review in "Reviews in American History" had some very interesting comments -- see http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/rah/23.4seely.html . Some excerpts:

"she, too, takes as her fundamental premise the centrality of technology to understanding American history"

"Thus the focus of her study is the mundane and ordinary, as McGaw inquires about the tools that people owned and used before 1850. Drawn from probate inventory records from several counties in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, McGaw's sample allows comparisons over time, and patterns she identifies often undercut standard assumptions about American technological independence, especially on the moving frontier. For example, as many people owned Bibles as guns (half), only a few more than half owned a plow, and 20 percent of women made do without a large kettle. In her interpretation of more than 26,000 items, she teases out information related to gender patterns and ethnic styles of the utilization of technology, especially and agricultural technology. "

Gee, I had the impression from glowing review s of Arming America that Bellesiles had came up with the idea of studying Probate records? Also, if above review is correct, why did McGaw find half of people owning firearms whereas I thought Bellesiles found only 5% of population and roughly 23% of white males 16+ years of age( page 446-7). (Households vice individuals?) It should be interesting comparing Bellesiles findings with McGaws -- hope to do so in a few days. McGaw's book is available via the online booksellers (Amazon, Barnesand Noble,etc ) if anyone wants to check for themselves.

On a separate note, I suggest people look at Foxfire 5 for information on how Southern mountaineers crafted flintlock rifles -- the blacksmithing techniques are very interesting and indepth. The article mentions an eastern Tennessee gunmaker (Bean) circa 1790 and makes the point that Bean made plain utilitarian rifles -- people could not pay for the expensive, time-consuming wood checkering , engraving, silver inlays found on more expensive rifles made on eastern seaboard.

The point being that many of the plain rifles made circa 1790 may not have survived because of the lack of aesthetic appeal --they were tools and hence less likely to be preserved in a museum or arms collection?

The second point being that gunsmiths may have been far more common than Bellesiles indicated -- Bellesiles indicated that the technology for making flintlock rifles was difficult, advanced, not widely-held -- which may not have been true. Tocqueville noted that books were fairly common even in remote wilderness homesteads. I wonder if Diderot's Encyclopedia or books on technical blacksmithing/ gun smithing were common?

Note: Another modern day source on rifle-making is a chapter in "The Art of BlackSmithing " by Alex Bealer. Also, Bellesiles mentions lack of flints as a constraint on militias (e.g., page 182, 186) Foxfire 5 shows how flints were easily made. It also describes the manufacture of gunpowder.

CORRECTION TO MY POST 22 (dated Mon Jan 28 15:56:04 2002 EST ) below. When I said "Bellesiles account of the Battle of New Orleans seems based solely on John Williams Ward's 1955 book" I should have noted that I was talking about the primary battle on 8 January and I should have said "Bellesiles account of the primary conflict (8 January) in the 1815 Battle of New Orleans seems based LARGELY on John Williams Ward's 1955 book" Bellesiles also cites John Elting's "Amateurs, To Arms!" (1995) and Latour "Historical Narrative" at one point in the narrative. My apologies.

NOTE Veritas msg directly below at Mon Jan 28 13:58:03 2002 EST

" The Chronicle of Higher Education" is inviting comments on Bellesiles's pitiful attempt to rewrite history... http://chronicle.com/colloquy/2002/guns/guns.htm "

POST 23

As noted in Post 22, Bellesiles echos John William Ward's assertion that Andrew Jackson's cannon won the Battle of New Orleans. This assertion is wrong for several reasons:

One, Jackson's swift attack on the British vanguard on 23 Dec 1814 stunned the British commander (Keane), paralyzed him into inaction, and gave Jackson 5 days to build a fortified line and bring up cannons. Jackson's hastily assembled force, made up of militias from Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Orleans,etc. won the battle --not cannon.

Two, Jackson's 7 main cannon batteries would have been swiftly overwhelmed by British infiltrators in night and fog, if they had not been protected by Jackson's militia infantry.

Three: Certainly cannon batteries and a fortified line were necessary for Jackson to protect his badly outnumbered forces --roughly 5000 troops of mostly militia vice the British Army of over 10,000 Regulars. However, an analysis of the main battle of 8 January shows that rifles, not cannon, inflicted the most damage on the British attackers.

In this battle, Jackson had a fortified line (rampart of piled earth about seven feet high with a four foot ditch in front). From Jackson's viewpoint (behind the line, facing the British Army), the line stretched 700 yards from the Mississippi River (on the right) across an open field to a swamp on the left. Seven primary cannon batteries were established --from Battery 1 on the right near the Mississippi to Battery 7 on the left near the edge of a swamp. After Battery 7 , the fortification extended into the swamp for roughly 700 yards and was defended by Coffee's 1,200 Tennessee riflemen. Jackson also had a cannon battery on the opposite (west) bank of the Mississippi, which could provide a crossfire into the area in front of Jackson's line.

The British army made a diversionary attack to seize a redoubt near Battery 1, but failed. The main attack, consisting of 2100 Regulars, was made on Battery 7. Later the attack was reinforced by a Highlander regiment (900 men), bring total attackers to 3,000 men. Roughly 2,000 of the attackers were killed or wounded in a 25 minute attack, while Jackson suffered roughly 10 killed and 10 wounded.

Analysis of weapons suggests majority of casualties were caused by RIFLE fire, NOT CANNONS. Remini indicates that Carroll had 1600 troops, spread over 290 yards ( 870 feet.) Remini indicates that Carroll's riflemen were set up in 4 lines which rotated to the front in sequence-- i.e., men in Line 1 fire, then move to back of Line 4 to reload while men in Line 2 step forward to shoot,etc. This is consistent with available space -- 400 men on line would give about 2.2 ft per man. Assuming flintlocks could be reloaded within 45 seconds, the 1600 men could pour out roughly 2300 rounds per minute. Jackson mentions Coffee's men also being engaged (Post 22) but Remini's description does not mention Coffee's men firing on the British right flank from the swamp --although the tactical layout would suggest this. If they were involved, aggregate rifle fires could rise to near 2800 rounds/minute.

Remini indicates that Battery 5 had two 6-lb cannon and one 18 lb cannon. (Designation indicates weight of projectile that is thrown. ) Battery 6 had a 12-lb. Battery 7 had a 18-lb and a 6-lb. The reference book "Weapons and Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars" by Philip Haythornthwaite indicates that light canister shot would be used at ranges less than 250 yards, that 6-lb cannon would shoot 85 bullets per shot, 12 lb'er 170 bullets/shot , and 18 lb'er 255 bullets/shot. It also indicates that 6 lb could be fired 2-3 times a minute (assume 2) and that 12 lb'er and up would be fired once a minute. (Remini indicates that visibility was initially 200-300 yards as early morning fog lifted. )

Based on the above, Batteries 5-7 could put out about 1190 bullets/minute. However, probably only 2/3 of the bullets would be effective, due to the size of the pattern at 200 yards (about 64 feet) causing some bullets to go over the heads of the British and some to plow into the mud. If this is assumed , then the EFFECTIVE cannon fire would only be about 900 rounds/minute --much less than the aggregate rifle fires discussed above. There are indications that the huge 32-lb cannon in Battery 4 was involved but it would only have added an additional 225 rounds/minute due to the need to use Heavy canister shot (3.5 oz) due to the range (>400 yards).

Analysis of manning and batteries indicate that Jackson's right flank (Batteries 1-3) had significantly more powerful cannon (three 24 lb, two 12lb) --yielding aggregate fire of 1360 rounds /minute over only 140 yards or 10 rds/minute per yard of frontage. versus the 4 rounds/minute per yard of Battery 5-7. Plus Battery1 was supported by crossfire from the battery on West Bank of Mississippi. To compensate, Batteries 5-7 had a higher density of riflemen assigned (5.5 riflemen/yard vs the 3 men/yard of Batteries 1-3. )

Bottom Line: Bellesiles and John Williams Ward's opinion that cannon carried the day was wrong -- it was both cannon and riflemen --and the riflemen made the larger contribution.

As I recall, John William Ward snipes that the artillery batteries were manned by regular Army men, regular Navy men , or by the Baratarian pirates. However, Remini indicates that Battery 6 near the main attack was manned by the New Orleans Creoles led by Louisiana legislator Flaujeac Garrigues.

It's depressing to consider that John William Ward's 1955 account with it's errors survived to be re-promulgated by Bellesiles 45 years later --and that college undergraduates will probably be reading Bellesiles' Arming America 45 year years hence --even if it's errors are revealed to the public this year. Due to lax review by the professional history community, it's too late to recover all those library purchases -- Arming America is buried in the shelves.

CORRECTION TO POST 22:

In post 22 below , I said: "Note that General Coffee commanded the Tennessee militia and Carroll was in overall command of Coffee's unit plus Kentuckian riflemen under Adair ..."

This requires clarification. Remini states on page 124 that General Carroll commanded Tennessee militia plus a number of Kentuckians (from Adair--page 138)--for a total of 1600 men spread out over about 290 yards from artillery Battery 5 to Battery 8. General Coffee had a separate battle command --between 800-1200 Tennessee militia, located to the left of Carroll (i.e., left of battery 8) and defending Jackson's left flank for several hundred yards into the swamp --i.e., the swamp which laid to the left of the line formed by Jackson's artillery Batteries 1-8. The 1600 men under General Carroll took the brunt of the British main attack but Jackson's account indicate that Coffee's men were also involved --probably by firing on the British right flank from the swamp, although Coffee's men also blocked an attempted flanking movement by a West Indian unit (Remini,p. 148)

Earlier, when Jackson was made a Regular Army general, Carroll succeeded Jackson as major general of the Tennessee militia.

NOTE Veritas msg directly below at Mon Jan 28 13:58:03 2002 EST

" The Chronicle of Higher Education" is inviting comments on Bellesiles's pitiful attempt to rewrite history... http://chronicle.com/colloquy/2002/guns/guns.htm "

POST 22

On page 258 Bellesiles continues with what appears to be the main theme of Arming America --that the citizen militia of early America was almost always a miserable failure. By implication, the image of the American militia held by most people is a myth and so is the NRA's concept of the Second Amendment. At this point Bellesiles attacks the "myth" associated with the Battle of New Orleans:

"The classic vision is of frontier riflemen mowing down British Regulars with brilliant marksmanship. But as in the Revolution, there is little evidence of such skill in the handling of firearms ...Cannon, not firearms, won the Battle of New Orleans. The myth, and the old song, give all credit to the Kentucky riflemen. Every military historian knows, as John Ward so concisely put it, that 'it can be flatly asserted that Jackson's overwhelming victory can in no way be attributed to the sharpshooting skill of the American frontiersman.' ...But the myth of Kentucky riflemen picking which eye of British officers to shoot out fulfilled some deep national yearning. "

It's interesting that this "myth" seems to have been held by Andrew Jackson and the major American military commanders at the Battle of New Orleans. General Coffee, whose Tennessee militiamen were near the British main attack, said: "Before they reached our small arms, our grape and canister mowed down whole columns, but that was nothing to the carnage of our Rifles and muskets." (Source: Remini, "The Battle of New Orleans", page 148).

There is a community service organization, called National Exchange Club, which provides copies of 30 major American political documents to schools (see http://www.freedomshrine.com/page3.html) . One of those documents is Jackson's description of the major battle at New Orleans on January 8:

"I cannot speak sufficiently in praise of the firmness & deliberation with which my whole line received their approach:-more could not have been expected from veterans, inured to war. For an hour the fire of the small arms was as incessant & severe as can be imagined. The artillery too, directed by officers who displayed equal skill & courage did great execution- Yet the columns of the enemy continued to advance with a firmness which reflects upon them the greatest credit. Twice the column which approached me on my left was repulsed by the troops of genl. Carrole - those of genl. Coffee, & a division of the Kentucky Militia, & twice they formed again & renewed the assault.

At length however, cut to pieces, they fled in confusion from the feild, leaving it covered with their dead & wounded. The loss which the enemy sustained on this occasion cannot be estimated at less than 1500 in killed wounded & prisoners- "

Note that General Coffee commanded the Tennessee militia and Carroll was in overall command of Coffee's unit plus Kentuckian riflemen under Adair. Andrew Jackson's account seems to support the myth --not Bellesiles. How can that be?

It's interesting that Bellesiles account of the Battle of New Orleans seems based solely on John Williams Ward's 1955 book "Andrew Jackson: Symbol for An Age". (His other citations -- of early newspaper accounts --seem to be taken from Ward's book.) For one thing, the Battle of New Orleans is a small part (pages 16-27) of Ward's book.

Moreover, Ward's book is not really history --it is an early essay in American Studies --the study of our culture. Ward notes that he did not investigate the Battle deeply since the work had already been done by others ---he is recounting the Battle mainly to examine how the myth of the frontier sharpshooter developed. This is part of his overall attempt to examine how Jackson became a "symbol" of American values in the early 1800s.

At this point, real historians may be smirking. The foremost historian on Andrew Jackson, Robert Remini, wrote an in-depth study --"The Battle of New Orleans" -- in 1999 and it's interesting to compare his account of the Battle with Ward's.

"Cultural historian" Ward sees some mass psychological process at work in accounting for why the "myth" of New Orleans does not include the heroic efforts of the regular soldiers, free Blacks, and New Orleans Creoles who made up a significant part of Jackson's army. Mr. Remini, with his historian's narrowminded focus on simply determining what happened, notes that those units "hardly fired a shot" because they were deployed in the middle of Jackson's line (from Batteries 3 to 5) and the British did not attack there(page 155). The British made a feint at Battery 1 (140 yards to the right) and were easily repelled by the two brass 12-lb cannons plus the 3 massive 24-lb cannons of Batteries 2-3. The British main "human wave" attack occurred on Battery 7 located 225 yards to the left --defended by General Carroll's 1,600 Tennessee and Kentuckian riflemen. Given this information, maybe we could apply Ward's methodology and conclude the that attack on Battery 7 was a joint Anglo-Saxon conspiracy between the British and Kentuckians, designed to deny the Creoles and free Blacks their share of the credit.

Ward concludes (assumes?) that the riflemen must have been ineffective because they could not see to aim-- due to cannon smoke. Robert Leckie in "The Wars of America" states that Jackson ordered the two left batteries ( 7 & 8?) to stop firing so that the riflemen could see (no citation given). Remini (page 143) notes that there was a "slight breeze" which caused British flags to flap.

In his text, Ward sneers at the marksmanship of Coffee's Tennessee militia, noting that they lost a markmanship contest to Captain Beale's unit subsequent to the battle. Ward describes Beales' unit as consisting of the "leading merchants and professional characters" of New Orleans. Bellesiles repeats Ward's account and notes "Contrary to one of the most cherished fictions in American culture, simply living on the frontier did not make one an excellent shot."

Ward and Bellesile's logic -- that losing to Beales' unit indicates that the Tennessee militia were bad shots --is flawed. In modern times, civilian marksmen compete against the US military's top shots at the Camp Perry annual matches -- who wins varies from year to year --but all contestants are superb marksmen. Remini notes that Beales unit had the most expert markmen of New Orleans. Wealthy merchants could buy the best guns and could afford the time and amno for practice. In 1815, New Orleans was a city of roughly 25,000 people surrounded by hundreds of miles of wilderness and with rural plantations spread for miles up and down the Mississippi. Unlike the urban residents of Amherst College and Emory University, the residents of 1815 New Orleans probably had not developed a gun phobia.

It's really not clear why Bellesiles did not look at several military histories of the Battle of New Orleans before reaching his judgments. Unless one assumes that Bellesiles wanted a politically correct history and Ward's badly flawed sociological musings, written in the 1950s, was the best he could find. Military histories, like the US Army's "American Military History" ( http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-06.htm , page 145 near bottom )indicate that the Battle of New Orleans was won by both riflemen and cannon -- I will explain why in a subsequent post. Of course, Bellesiles should have gone to the primary sources -- battle accounts like those of Coffee and Jackson above.

POST 21

Bellesiles' criticism of the US militia performance in the burning of Washington DC in 1814 leaves out some important information: When the British expeditionary force continued on toward Baltimore, it was sounded defeated by the same militia and its leader, General Ross was killed.

The US Army's "American Military History" discusses the War of 1812 at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-06.htm and concludes:

"The militia performed as well as the Regular Army. The defeats and humiliations of the Regular forces during the first years of the war matched those of the militia, just as in a later period the Kentucky volunteers at the Thames and the Maryland militia before Baltimore proved that the state citizen soldier could perform well. "

The premier general of the war was Andrew Jackson -who was commander of the Tennessee militia and was later made a major general in the Regular Army when he showed that he, unlike some Regular officers, could win battles.

In my opinion, Bellesiles deliberately presents the citizen militia in a very false light --and distorts history -- in a continual biased attack on the idea of a citizen militia.

POST 20

On pages 252-261 of Arming America, Bellesiles continues his long indictment of the citizen militia concept by arguing that the poorly armed militia of 1812 was a threat to national security. Some quotes of Bellesiles:

(a) "the United States entered the War of 1812 grotesquely unprepared for a sustained conflict" (p.252)

(b) "The concerns of the War Department were well founded, for when the British did attack Washington DC in August 1814 the militia crumbled ...It was a sorry show, as smoke rose from the burning White House, and British sailors cavorted in the Capitol"(p. 255)

(c) "Matters were no better with frontier militia units, which also lacked arms and experience with their use" (p. 256)

(d) "One could go on and on with examples of inept, poorly armed ,and horribly disciplined militia almost losing the War of 1812 for the United States." (p.257)

(Bellesiles also discusses the myth of the militia in the Battle of New Orleans, which I will treat in a separate post. )

Bellesiles' discussion is very misleading to readers (US voters) who have not studied the War of 1812. The War of 1812 was a clumsy effort done for poorly conceived objectives. The causes for the war were (1) Britain did not want US merchant ships docking in French ports and selling supplies to Napoleon's France. (2) With a strong wartime need for sailors, the British Navy had stopped some US ships and forcibly seized sailors who the Navy judged to be British deserters (3) US settlers in the Midwest and South believed Britain was encouraging Indian attacks - plus some political leaders wanted to seize Canada. The declaration of War was encouraged by politicians in the South and Midwest - it was strongly opposed by the New England states who considered seceding from the US over the damage to their foreign trade (Hartford Convention). The Congressional vote for war did not have a large majority in either house and was called Mr. Madison's War in New England.

The security of the US was never at stake in the War of 1812. England could only support roughly 30,000 troops in North America when she made a desperate attempt to keep her colonies in 1780 -she was not much better off in 1812 while fighting with Napoleon. In 1776, US population was roughly 2.5 million - by 1810, it had grown to 6.8 million. There was no way that Britain could conquer the US -the British military goals were to (1) blockade US (2) Come down Hudson to see if she could split off New England (3) Plunder the rich city of New Orleans. The US goal was to acquire Canada. End result: US invasions of Canada failed -in part because of the lack of Support in the New England basing areas and partly because of Canadian resistance. British foray into US from Canada failed. Andrew Jackson badly bloodied British troops at New Orleans and exterminated a sizable portion of the Creek Indian Nation. Britain blockaded US but US privateers acquired lots of loot in Europe. End result: US and UK decide to stop the fight and accept the status quo that existed prior to the war.

In Chapter Seven, subsection "A Proper Defense" (page 219), Bellesiles appears to suggest that the militia were unsatisfactory in protecting the country from insurrection (Shay's Rebellion and Whiskey Rebellion.) In my opinion, the militia showed one of their greatest advantages - that they are a poor instrument for oppression of their fellow citizens. The Continental Congress had destroyed the country's economy by printing too much money and by stupid political bickering. In Shay's Rebellion, bankers in Boston were using their influence with the Massachusetts legislation to oppress the poor farmers of western Massachusetts --throwing people into prison for their debts in the midst of a depression. In the Whiskey Rebellion, farmers were protesting new taxes being laid under bad economic conditions. The empathy that the militia felt for their fellow citizens is to their credit, not discredit as Bellesiles seems to imply.

On page 239, Bellesiles says "a largely unarmed United States faced an angry world in 1808" --yet he says on page 241 that an 1803 census listed 235,831 firearms. He notes that this "was enough guns for 45 percent of the militia."

Bellesiles' suggestion that the militia was a poor defense for the country because it was inadequately armed circa 1800-1812 is wrong. The UK could only afford to support roughly 30,000 troops in North America even when she was trying to keep the Colonies in 1780. In the major battle of 1815 at New Orleans, she mustered roughly 10,000 men. The US's 235,831 firearms were enough.

POST 18

In Chapter Seven of Arming America, Bellesiles ends his discussion of the Second Amendment (subsection "The Constitution and Guns") by noting that some people called for universal ownership of guns and a universal militia. Bellesiles responds:

But those with experience of the realities of government, war, and gun production knew that such visions were fantasies. The leaders of the new nation followed Washington's lead in calling for a standing army backed by a smaller, more organized, and better-armed militia."

In my opinion, Bellesiles is deliberately misleading the reader at this point. As I noted in earlier Post 15 (Thu Jan 24 13:26:36 2002 EST ), Washington called for dependency on the Militia for national defense with a very small standing army and a more powerful Navy-- since we were separated from Europe by the Atlantic. Because of the Newburgh Conspiracy, most members of Congress agreed with Washington on the dangers of a Standing Army and supported use of the Militia. As a result, they passed the Militia Act of 1792, NOT The Standing Army Act of 1792.

On page 216, Bellesiles briefly discusses concerns that Anti-Federalists had over the powers in the new Constitution; only to dismiss them:

"The Anti-Federalists wanted both sides of the argument, that the federal government would both arm and fail to arm the militia"

POST 16

On page 217-218 of Arming America, Bellesiles gives several quotes from James Madison (author of the Constitution and Amendments 1-10 (Bill of Rights) ) to suggest that the Militia was intended to enforce federal power over the populace. What Bellesiles does NOT provide his readers is the following quote from Madison's Federalist No. 46:

"Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it. "

Note how Madison noted, as a matter of course, that the general populace would possess more than enough firearms to defend themselves -- I guess he didn't have Bellesiles there to tell him that the people didn't own firearms.

Note also that James Madison wrote the Second Amendment to ensure that the Militia (the People) would have the right to own firearms. The leaders of a coup might seize militia armories -- they could never disarm the general populace of their unregistered firearms. The same is true today -- National Guard armories can be seized and National Guard units can be imprisoned -- but 270 million Americans with 200 million unregistered firearms are the ultimate safeguard of our Congress, our Supreme Court, our State Governments, and our Constitution. Something that academic girley boys like Bellesiles and Garry Wills could never conceive.

The Militia is well-regulated -- someone who misuses a firearm can be charged under multiple criminal counts including murder. And certainly Congress controls the Militia. What Congress can NOT do is disarm the Militia via gun-control measures -- just as it cannot scrap the other Bill of Rights: freedom of speech, press, assemble,etc. The reason is that to do so would endanger the Constitution and the existence of future Congresses.

Yes, the State Governments regulated access to firearms in the early Republic. The Bill of Rights did not really become binding on the State Governments until after passage of the 14th Amendment. Part of the motivation behind Congress's passage of the 14th Amendment was to ensure that Southern blacks would have the Second Amendment right possess firearms in order to protect themselves. As liberal Akhil Amar (Professor, Yale Law) has noted, when guns are banned only the Klan will have guns. See the Amicus Curiae filed by the Congress of Racial Equality in US vs Emerson -- a copy is at http://www.potomac-inc.org/emercore.html .

In Chapter 7 of Arming America, Bellesiles makes the following account:

(a)"The early national period witnessed a tension between federal efforts to arm white male Americans and elite fears that poor whites might put such weapons to an incorrect, class-based one... Nationalists found ample justification for their fears in Shay's Rebellion." (Page 210).

(b) "Shay's Rebellion was one of several key factors responsible for the calling of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787. To those favoring a stronger national government, the Revolution had clearly demonstated the flaws in the militia when faced with a foreign invader, while the insurrection in Massachusetts indicated the unreliability of the militia when confronted with internal disorder." (page 212 )

(c) "Madison had his way, as article I, section 8, of the Constitution granted Congress the authority to call 'forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.' Some modern observers argue that the framers perceived the militia as a check on governmental power; yet the Constitution accomplishes the exact opposite, making the militia a potential tool of the central government for the repression of any challenge to federal authority." (page 213) **************************

Bellesiles' account has an interesting black hole --something left unmentioned -- which suggests that the fear of "poor whites" with firearms exists among some people today -- maybe even among cloistered academicians. There was a THIRD threat to the country and Congress -- it's own armed forces. And Congress knew from personal experience that this third threat was the most potent.

It's curious that Bellesiles makes no mention of the Newburgh Conspiracy of 1783 -- in which the officer corp of the Continental Army was on the verge of overthrowing Congress in a military coup. This coup was only stopped by a last minute appeal from George Washington. See the description of the Conspiracy in the opening paragraphs of the following Air Force document: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/wester.html . I cite this reference because it also describes some modern-day strains on civilian control of the military. The Conspiracy is also described at http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/fall97/wshngton.html and in the US Army's American Military History at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-05.htm .

The Newburgh Conspiracy scared the hell out of Congress. 5 years of full pay was awarded to discharged officers and by late 1784 Congress had reduced the Continental Army to 80 artillerymen retained to guard military stores at West Point and Fort Pitt. The US Army's American Military History (http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-05.htm ,page 102 ) describes why Congress and George Washington favored the militia over a standing army:

When Congress looked at Shay's Rebellion, it saw that a lot of Shay's followers were former member of the Continental Army.

What Bellesiles does not mention is that Congress's power to call out the Militia to suppress Insurrections includes the power to suppress Insurrections WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND MILITARY FORCES. The Executive Branch controls the federal military -- Congress and the Supreme Court are vulnerable if the President and part of the military ignores the Constitution. The Constitution explicitly notes this possibility -- Article I gives Congress the power to impeach/remove the President and all civil officers of the United States and Article II notes this can be done for " Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. ". Elsewhere in the Constitution, Treason is defined as "waging war on the United States." Obviously, the only way the President can wage war on the United States is in his role a commander of federal military forces.

What protects the Congress if the President and leaders of a military coup ignore impeachment? The Militia. Per the Constitution, the Congress controls who commands the Militia -- it is the State Governors unless Congress gives command to the President. In the event of an attempted coup by the President and federal military, the State Governors would protect the Congress and the Supreme Court. After Congress convicts and removes the President and Vice-President, command of the federal military would pass to the new President -- either Congress's Speaker of the House or the Senate's President Pro Tem. And the State Militias would enforce this.

Gun control advocates argue that the Militia is the National Guard. This is wrong. The Militia includes the National Guard, but it's major component is civilian males. By law ( US Code, Title 10, Chapter 13, Sec 311,). the Militia is all able-bodied males 17-44 years of age who are not members of the federal military. See http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/311.html .

The idea of a military coup is hard to imagine in today's United States. It will be less hard to imagine if the US ever falls into a deep depression like the one people endured in the 1780s , when the US economy collapsed because Congress printed too much money to finance the Revolutionary War and the currency became worthless. Similar circumstances (worthless currency, loss of life savings, high unemployment ,debt) is what helped Hitler and the Nazis overthrow the Weimar Republic in the Great Depression.

I think it is indicative of Bellesiles's strong bias that he mentions none of the above to his readers.

It's interesting that Bellesiles' speculation regarding ineffective American resistance to the British might actually be plausible for one area of the colonies: New York City and Philadelphia. While the people of Boston were indomitable, I recall no resistance to British occupations of New York City and Philadelphia.

There were a fair number of Tories in those cities, of course. Merchants who remained loyal to King George because they depended on trade with England. Such men probably forced their political views on those dependent upon them for business -- artisans, workers, renters,etc. Possibly just like today, the wealthy class of those cities favored limits on gun ownership, so that the unwashed rabble --the urban poor-- could be kept under control.

I wonder how well the policy of craven appeasement and disarmment worked? I wonder how the wealthy class of Philadelphia and New York City protected the virtue of their women when British troops --enlisted men at that -- were quartered in their homes during those long winter months?

On page 178 of Arming America, Bellesiles says "It became almost a fad in the last year before the war to make outrageous claims of shooting prowess" and then cites as an example Richard Henry Lee's claim circa Feb 1775 that western Virginia could furnish six thousand 'Rifle Men that for their number make [the] most formidable light Infantry in the World'. Bellesiles then sneers "For some reason these six thousand marksmen did not materialize during the war".

Well, actually, many of those riflemen did materialize. When British Officer Ferguson made threats to settlers in Tennessee, Kentucky, and southwestern Virginia, about 1,000 "OverMountain Men" (i.e., those on the other side of the Smoky Mountains from South Carolina) invaded South Carolina, trapped Ferguson and his Tory militia on King's Mountain,and destroyed them. The US Army's American Military History notes :

"King's Mountain was as fatal to Cornwallis' plans as Bennington had been to those of Burgoyne. The North Carolina Tories, cowed by the fate of their compatriots, gave him lime [limited??] support. The British commander on October In 1780, began a wretched retreat in the rain back to Winnsboro, South Carolina, with militia harassing his progress. Clinton was forced to divert an expedition of 2,500 men sent to establish a base in Virginia to reinforce Cornwallis. "

Source: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-04.htm ; page 91

I also wonder where all those riflemen at King's Mountain, all those armed militiamen under Colonel Pickens at Cowpens, and all those armed guerilla fighters under Francis Marion came from? Based on Bellesiles chapters on Colonial America, I thought few of the settlers had guns?

Incidently, Bellesiles' citation of the Battle of Paoli on page 204 to suggest that the noble bayonet was the real weapon, not those dastardly guns, is highly misleading. He says: "Certainly the British victory at Long Island demonstrated the wisdom of that reliance [on the bayonet ] , as did the even more notorious battle at Paoli the following year, where the British attacked with muskets from which the flints had been removed, using their bayonets to decimate the Americans before they had a chance to load their weapons. ...British bayonet charges repeatedly stopped American attacks , and proved particularly terrifying to militia units. "

This is rancid horseshit, of course -- but not likely to be detected by the many people reading Arming America who are not scholars of the Revolutionary War. The Massacre of Paoli WAS A NIGHT ATTACK and the musket flints were removed so that some clumsy oaf wouldn't accidently fire his musket and awaken the Anthony Wayne's soldiers who were sleeping by their campfires. The American soldiers not only did not have time to load their weapons-- some did not have time to cast off their blankets.

Kinda gives the readers a different view, no? In my opinion, this paragraph is a good example of what I've came to see as the "Bellesiles paradigm " --withhold major, relevant information in order to mislead the naive with a false impression and thereby convince them of your argument.

In Chapter 5 "Brown Bess in the Wilderness" ,as well as in earlier chapters, Bellesiles appears to argue that the general populace's lack of support for colonial militia indicates that they possessed few firearms. In my opinion, what it suggests is that the Colonists had better things to do than play soldier, in the absence of a threats. A few sporadic Indian attacks were unlikely to motivate the majority of settlers who lived closer to the seaboard. Somehow, those laughable, incompetent unwarlike Colonists managed to defeat Indians, French soldiers, British regulars, and a large populace of black slaves.

I think Bellesiles fails to realize there are alternative explanations for the snapshot anecdotes he trots out. Obviously, communities tended to put forward young, unmarried, poor laborors when a militia was called up for service outside a community. Established , married farmers would want to stay home to protect their family and property -- and they would have wanted to keep their firearms to do so. And firearms owners would have been unlikely to turn their personal arms over to the government in a time of danger -- just look at the modern-day run on gun sales after the September 11 terrorist attacks. And the impovished workers put forward for the militia draft would most likely reported without a firearm --in hope government would supply them with one which they could later keep as a bonus.

Some of Bellesiles arguments seem inconsistent. On page 188, Bellesiles suggests colonial militias were poorly prepared in 1776 because they were making pikes since blacksmiths could make pikes but many could not make good firearms. Yet he later argues on page 204 that the bayonet was the decisive weapon for the British -- that they would fire one volley at close range (e.g., 50 yards) and then charge with the bayonet. If that was the case, then what was wrong with colonial militia taking advantage of their manpower advantage and giving pikes to men without firearms.? A militiaman with a little training and a pike could standup to a British regular charging with a bayonet and could protect a rifleman.

I was also bewildered by Bellesiles anecdote on page 182 that even militias who had firearms had shortages of necessary equipment. He notes that "the seventy-two men of the Charlestown, New Hampshire militia owned thirty guns of various kinds, but only ten ramrods, an absolute necessity for loading a musket". Huh? Couldn't the colonists, who make their own homes and furniture, whittle out 20 ramrods -- which are basically 3 foot sticks???

On page 103 of Arming America, Bellesiles wonders off into hilarious speculation about how American settlers fed themselves in the 1700s. He says "After all, one of the most popular and persistent visions of the American past is that every settler owned a gun in order to hunt...This is a very strange perception. Hunting is and always has been a time-consuming and inefficient way of putting food on the table. People settling a new territory have little time ... To head off into the woods for two days in order to drag the carcass of a deer back to his family-- assuming that he was lucky enough to find one, not to mention kill it -- would have struck any American of the Colonial period as supreme lunacy". Bellesiles then goes on to suggest the settler would kill one of his farm animals -- a chicken or hog. Bellesiles point appears to be that a settler did not need a firearms and hence he was unlikely to own one.

Actually, what I think this suggests is that urban professors of history know little about rural self-sufficiency. Tocqueville's account of the canonical settler's farm even as late as 1834 makes it clear that the settler was little above the Indian hunter-gatherer stage for the first several years. (See http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/ap_u.htm ) In year one, trees were killed by girding the bark and corn,beans,squash etc. were planted among the forest of dead trees, since the leaves had fallen and sunlight could penetrate. In year two, the settler might try to cut down and burn some of the trees, but the job would be incomplete , with crops planted among the fallen tree trunks as Tocqueville indicates. It might be a decade before the settler had a cleared farm which could support enough grain to feed a mule or horse and which had been cleared of tree stumps that obstruct plowing. The diet of grains (corn, wheat) and legumes (beans) would need at least some meat to provide certain proteins. Plus, total dependence on farms crops would lead to starvation of the family in the event of drought, insects,blights,etc. And crops were available of course only after harvest, usually in the fall.

In such conditions, a 400 lb deer which could provide a family of four with maybe 80 meals would be a godsend especially since the meat could be saved as venison or salted. Having a flintlock rifle which could kill deer would be a necessary insurance policy, .

Contrary to Bellesiles' description, It would not be necessary to travel for two days, risk an unsuccessful hunt, and drag the deer back home. The forest clearings that the settler made would attract nearby deer who would come to feed on the resulting tree saplings, brush, and farmer crops. This would be especially likely if the settler was located near a stream -- which most were in order to have access to water. (Even those who dug wells wanted to be near a high water table in order hit water 10-15 feet down.) Farmers preferred bottomland near a stream that would be flooded in the spring so that the soil would be replenished --corn rapidly depletes the soil. (Those who suggest spreading manure fail to realize that several acres would be needed to feed a plowhorse -- with the resulting labor burden of plowing and cultivating grain for the horse. )

The more affluent or established settler who owned a plow horse or mule could ride farther afield to hunt, if need be.

I live in the suburbs of a major city and I have a herd of deer come into my yard every night, especially in the wintertime when foliage is sparse. I can approach to within 40 yards of the deer --easily prey with a firearm. Bellesiles suggestion on page 29 that bows are comparable to --or even superior to -- flintlocks can be easily discarded by anyone who has ever tried to shoot a primitive bow -- it took years of practice to develop the shoulder muscles and skills of a Welsh longbowman --most people would find they could not hit a deer beyond 10 yards with a bow --whereas they could hit a deer out to 40 yards with a musket --even farther with a rifle. The Indians discarded bows and bought flintlock muskets -- not the reverse.

The settler would have needed a rifle to kill deer just to prevent them from eating his crops -- any farmer of today will tell you how deer are impossible to fence out and how they can destroy a corn patch. Plus the settler would have needed to kill predators --foxes, wolves, cougars -- that threatened his domestic animals.

Finally, a settler in an isolated rural setting would have wanted a firearm for protection of his family -- locking yourself in a log cabin and firing out a porthole is a perfect defense strategy when the nearest constable is 50 miles away.

On page 106 , Bellesiles suggests gun ownership would have been low in Colonial America because "a gun represented the equivalent of two months wages ". So what? Even today, many rural men have gun collections with a value greater than two months wages --and they do not have as pressing a need for a gun as did colonial settlers. Two months wages is a low price for a tool which will last a lifetime.

Finally, I'm skeptical of Bellesiles speculation that guns had to be imported. The book Foxfire 5 describes how Southern mountaineers built flintlock rifles.

In Chapter Two of Arming America , titled "The Role of Guns in the Conquest of North America", Bellesiles seems to be trying to convince the reader that guns in the 1700s were of limited value. On page 43, he states "The famous Kentucky rifle took, on average, three minutes to load." Bellesiles goes on to say "most of those familiar with guns agreed that it was useless to aim at any target beyond twenty yards with any expectation of hitting it." (I assume that in the latter sentence, he was talking about muskets,not rifles, but he is not clear.

By contrast, Lawrence Babits notes in "A Devil of a Whipping" that (a) "Experienced RIFLEMEN could fire one shot every FIFTEEN SECONDS on a good day"(page 14) (NOT every 3 minutes as Bellesiles said) and (b) the musket could hit a man out to 80 yards in 5 out of 6 shots fired within one minute (page 13). Babits's footnote indicates that he personally verified that (b) could be done by doing it himself. He notes that the common practice of loading buckshot with the musket ball would increase the hit probability.

Babits also quotes British Colonel Hanger, who lived in 1776, as saying: "An expert rifleman ...can hit the head of a man at 200 yards. I am certain, that, provided an American rifleman were to get a perfect aim at 300 yards at me, standing still, he most undoubtedly would hit me, unless it was a very windy day." (page 14) Babits does express some skepticism about this and I would concur --given blackpowder velocities, bullets start dropping several feet below line of sight at around 150 yards. The essential factor in accuracy is whether the range is accurately known (i.e. is paced off ) or whether it has to be visually estimated. I would guess that defenders who had time to pace off and mark distances could hit men out to 200 yards by adjusting for known bullet drop. I would guess that men on the traveling offense , firing at estimated ranges, might only be able to hit a man out to 125 yards. In any event, musket and rifle were far more deadly than I think Bellesiles suggests.

How odd.

Recent media references cited with articles attacking "Disarming America" include the New York Times, Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune and many others. Yet there's been NO cited recent reference in favor of this book.

Perhaps even the liberals know when they have stepped in it, big time.

On Emory Univerity's web site, there's an interesting article in Emory's "Academic Exchange" regarding the criticism of Bellesiles' Arming America. The article includes the following rather fatuous quote from Mr. Bellesiles:

----------------------------------------

Bellesiles is more wary than ever of public debate about his work. "I think the only place this kind of conversation could go on is in scholarly journals, and there it's not really a conversation", he told theAcademic Exchange; "It's more a long-term dialogue."

Nonetheless, he writes to his OAH colleagues, "The real test before our profession, it seems to me, is our ability to address an issue of contemporary concern in a scholarly fashion without evoking relentless denunciation and severe passions."

Source: http://www.emory.edu/ACAD_EXCHANGE/2002/decjan/silenced.html

------------------------------------------------------------

Well, let's see what's Michael's idea of scholarly discourse. He puts up his letter here on the OAH site. By my reading, his letter appears to be mainly an attempt to suggest his critics are violent, right-wing loons.

However, when readers of his letter and book post their criticisms here, he remains silent.

Here, Michael, Michael. Are you lying out there in the weeds, quivering and hoping that the hounds will go away?

After all, another possible viewpoint of this debate, Michael, is that gun control advocates are trying to put gun owners in prison for exercising a clearly defined Constitutional right. Gun control advocates are trying to undermine a basic constitutional check on the power of the Executive Branch.

Michael, you proclaim in your letter here that:

"Arming America does not, to my knowledge, support any contemporary political position. Nor am I, as is often charged on the web, paid by any major gun-control group, political party, or secret conspiratorial organization. "

In my opinion, your facade of academic objectivity is hilarious. For example, what about the "Second Amendment Symposium" in February 2000? ( http://www.gunlawsuits.org/defend/second/symposium/symposium.asp )

A quote from their transcripts:

"On February 16, 2000, the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence hosted a distinguished group of historians at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., to challenge the gun lobby's on-going campaign of misinformation about the Second Amendment.."

When I look at their list of 4 historians I see ...why, it's you, Michael!! Why did a partisan anti-gun group with an ax to grind invite an "objective academican" like yourself? Or did you just wander in by mistake? Did they pay you anything or was your talk strictly pro bono ? Maybe you could have Emory University provide a link to the Second Amendment Symposium web site cited above in Emory's Academic Exchange page -- so that your student could gape in awe at your scholarly impartiality?

Chicago Tribune, 01/23/02, “Wormy apples from the groves of Academe”

QUOTE:

Eventually, both sides -- Bellesiles and his detractors -- asked Randolph Roth, an Ohio State University professor, to endorse their side of the argument. Roth's specialty is the history of Vermont, and Bellesiles said he had acquired part of his data by examining Vermont's probate records to see how frequently guns show up in inventories of estates.

"I offered Bellesiles to go to Vermont and check his data," said Roth, adding that he got a thanks-but-no-thanks response. His interest piqued, Roth decided to check those records anyway, and he compared what Bellesiles' book claimed was in those archives with what he himself found in the documents.

"I came to the conclusion," Roth said, "that the number and scope of his errors were extraordinary."

Bellesiles said that guns were present in only 14 percent of estates. Roth found them in 40 percent.

James Lindgren, a Northwestern University law professor, was drawn to a note in Bellesiles' book reporting that he had used records from 19th Century San Francisco. Thinking to have his own students analyze those documents, he asked Bellesiles where they were. Bellesiles said he found them in the archives of the San Francisco Superior Court.

"I called the San Francisco Superior Courthouse," Lindgren said, "and discovered that the complete runs of inventories he claims to have read there were destroyed in the 1906 earthquake and fire."

Last week Bellesiles e-mailed colleagues that he finally remembers drawing his data, not from records in San Francisco but from those in the entirely different county of Contra Costa, records housed in the Contra Costa County Historical Society. Kathleen Mero, a longtime archivist there, says she and other staff members are quite familiar with the controversy surrounding Bellesiles' book. She says she doesn't remember Bellesiles doing research at the group's storefront archives.

"If he had examined our records," Mero said, "he would have found guns all over the place."

Bellesiles continues to have supporters. Yet their defense sometimes seems more of a left-handed compliment. Paul Finkleman, a law professor at the University of Tulsa, says Bellesiles' book remains an important contribution, despite its critics.

"In the end," Finkleman said, "I don't think it matters if he cooked the data."

Other former supporters have turned critics, among them Donald Hickey, a history professor at Wayne State College in Nebraska. Bellesiles previewed the thesis of his book in a scholarly article that he submitted to the Journal of American History.

On receipt, the editor asked Hickey to "referee" it according to the time-honored process by which one scholar's work is evaluated by another. Hickey recommended its publication, saying it made a persuasive case that guns weren't widely owned in America's early days.

Since then, Hickey has changed his view of Bellesiles' work.

"It is a case," Hickey said, "of genuine, bona fide academic fraud."

http://www.chicagotribune.com/features/lifestyle/chi-0201230024jan23.story

On page 196 of Arming America , Bellesiles again sneers at the American militia, noting how their flight at the Battle of Camden allowed DeKalb's Continentals to be overwhelmed. Certainly, Camden was not the militias' finest hour, although the leadership of General Horatio Gates bears some study.

Bellesiles discussion shows how he cherry-picks historical information to support his biased indictment of the militias. Bellesiles doesn't mention that by the time Camden occurred , DeKalb's Continentals were a small remnant of the southern Continental Army. What Bellesiles doesn't mention is that the real disaster had occurred earlier, at the Battle of Charleston, where Continental General Lincoln succumbed to political pressure from the South Carolina government and chose to defend Charleston --an Atlantic seaport where the full power of the British Navy could be brought to bear. The US Army's "American Military History" discusses the battle:

"With d'Estaing's withdrawal the British regained control of the sea along the American coast, giving Clinton a mobility that Washington could not match. While Clinton drew forces from New York and Savannah to achieve a decisive concentration of force (14,000 men) at Charleston, Washington was able to send only piecemeal reinforcements to Lincoln over difficult overland routes. Applying the lessons of his experience in 1776, Clinton this time carefully planned a co-ordinated Army-Navy attack. First, he landed his force on John's Island to the south, then moved up to the Ashley River, investing Charleston from the land side. Lincoln, under strong pressure from the South Carolina authorities, concentrated his forces in a citadel defense on the neck of land between the Ashley and Cooper Rivers, leaving Fort Moultrie in the harbor lightly manned. On April 8 British warships successfully forced the passage past Moultrie, investing Charleston from the sea. The siege then proceeded in traditional eighteenth century fashion, and on May 12, 1780, Lincoln surrendered his entire force of 5,466 men, the greatest disaster to befall the American cause during the war. "

Source: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-04.htm -- page down to middle of document at page 87

It was unfortunate that Lincoln let his army be captured in Charleston. Historian Lawrence Babits, in his book "A Devil of a Whipping--The Battle of Cowpens" has noted the strategic advantage Patriots in the interior of South Carolina had: Supplies could be floated down the rivers from the interior on boats and barges. Conversely, Cornwallis's supply problems increased the farther he got away from the coast because his supplies had to be brought up the Carolinian rivers since there were few roads through the Carolinian swamps on South Carolina's Coastal Plain. If Lincoln had moved his army into the interior, he could have easily penned Cornwallis's army up in Charleston by attacking supply shipments on the Ashley and Cooper rivers.

POST 6

In Chapter 6 "A People Numerous and Unarmed" of Arming America, Bellesiles dismisses the performance of American militia at Concord. He states:

"But other militia units lined the road back to Boston. Neither side in this long battle fought very well. Occasionally a unit of the British would trap some Americans and charge with their bayonets; at other times some rebels got off an effective volley and then retreated into the woods. But for the most part the British retreat was just a constant barrage of individual shots from each side, most missing, but enough hitting to disorganize the British command. ..Yet as French's careful study of the casualties suffered by the British on their retreat from Concord demonstrates 'superior as they[Americans] may have been to the British, marksmen they were not.' A total of 3,763 Americans are know to have participated in this long day of battle...among them they hit 273 British. "

Another reviewer, John G Fought, has already done an in-depth comparison of Bellesiles account with the 1994 study of the battle of Concord "Paul Revere's Ride" , done by historian David Hackett Fischer. Mr. Fought's review is at http://www.guncite.com/gun_control_bellesiles.html -- see the middle section entitled "American Militia and British Regulars in Combat, 1755 and 1775 ". After comparing Mr. Bellesiles' account with Fischer's detailed study, Mr. Fought concludes:

"From Fischer's account, which agrees in all important respects with General Galvin's, we can see that Bellesiles has again stacked the cards, in order to show the militia not so much in a bad light as in a false one, as a rabble just barely in arms, when in fact they assembled and maneuvered capably, and drove the British regulars quite hard all the way from Concord to Charlestown, inflicting nearly three times as many casualties as they suffered, breaking their line of battle twice, bringing the whole body of the enemy to the brink of surrender twice, capturing troops and munitions, and, of course, starting the War of Independence. Somewhat to my surprise, I became quite angry as I read the three pages Bellesiles devotes to selectively misrepresenting the actions of the Massachusetts militia on that day. It was this reaction that stimulated me to write these pages. "

After reading Fischer's book, I would agree with Mr. Fought. Mr. Bellesiles appears ignorant of military tactics. The British column was not a shooting gallery. The British army had a large number of skirmishers deployed 50 yards out from their column to protect their flanks. These skirmishers would try to attack and kill American militia creeping in for a shot. There was little cover for the militia in fields where fields laid on either side of the road. Point is, attacking the British column was a lot harder and dangerous than Bellesiles implies. Fischer's account shows the highly effective tactics used by the American militia --the moving ring around the British brigade, "dispersed tho' adhering"

Bellesiles concludes his account of Concord with the observation "The myth of a universally armed militia of marksmen ...would take a terrible beating over the ensuing eight years." It's interesting that Bellesiles quotes from British general Lord Percy in several succeeding pages (p. 184 and 204) yet does not quote the following observation made about the American militia by Lord Percy after Concord:

"Whoever looks on them as an irregular mob, will find himself very much mistaken. They have men amongst them who know very well what they are about, having been employed as rangers against the Indians and Canadians, and this country, being much covered with wood, and hilly, is very advantageous for their method of fighting." (Fischer 1994:254).

Regarding Michael Bellesiles and his book "Arming America" , one can see his strong bias against the armed citizen in his description of the Revolutionary War battle of Cowpens (page 197):

"The Battle of Cowpens in 1781 offered further evidence that it was still possible for the militia to fulfill their vaunted role. But that victory was the consequence of Daniel Morgan's careful planning in placing the militia in front of his Continental units, and his working out a deal with the militia whereby they agreed to fire a volley and then leave the field. Even then, Morgan repeatedly had to cajole and even beg the militia to keep their part of the bargain in the face of Banastre "Butcher" Tarleton's English forces, and most of the militia initially made to flee as soon as the English started to leave the field. It seemed as though the militia understood any movement as full-scale retreat, and Morgan and Colonel Andrew Pickens had to place themselves between the militia and their horses, waving their swords threateningly in order to keep them from turning victory into rout. The militia kept blundering around the field, convincing the British that the Americans were in flight. At that very moment when the British confidently charged, Morgan had Lieutenant Colonel John Howard's Continentals perform a perfect change of direction, fire a withering musket volley at ten yards, and then charge the British with fixed bayonets. Tarleton's forces collapsed before the American bayonets, and the militia, which had to fire only that single volley, managed to hold on to their guns this time. "

****************************

Other historians give a much different account. See , for example, the US Army Military History at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-04.htm (scroll down to "Greene's Southern Campaign"). See also the Cowpens Staff Ride monograph developed by Colonel Jerry D. Morelock (Combat Studies Institute of U.S. Army Command and General Staff College) at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/CSIPUBS/Moncure/moncure.htm . See the National Park Service description of the Battle of Cowpens at http://www.nps.gov/cowp/batlcowp.htm. Finally, see Lawrence E. Babits' in-depth study of Cowpens in "A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens"(1998). All four of these sources give a consistent account which is much different from the biased one that Bellesiles gives above. Briefly, their account is as follows:

1) Morgan chose battlefield at Cowpens --an open area several hundred yards in width sloping upward to a broad hill. Forming up at the hill, Morgan laid out his lines as follows:

Line number 1 was a skirmish line formed by sharpshooters (McDowell's North Caroline militia plus Hammond's South Carolina State Troops) tasked with picking off British officers. 150 yards back was Line 2, consisting of four battalions of South Carolina militia commanded by Colonel Pickens. Morgan ordered this line to fire two volleys and to then retreat to the rear of Line 3 in order to reconstitute (reload rifles) and form a reserve. 150 yards behind line 2 was Line number 3 -- regular Continental troops under command of Colonel Howard plus Virginia militia units under Major Triplett and Captain Tate. Hidden behind the hill to Morgan's rear was a troop of cavalry under Col. Washington.

2) As planned , Line 1 shoots Tarleton's officers during British advance and retreats to augment Line 2. As ordered by Morgan, the 4 South Carolina militia battalions on Line 2 fire 1-2 volleys each and retreat to the rear left flank of Line 3. The skirmish unit under Hammond forms the left flank of Line 3 while McDowell's skirmish unit falls back to defend the right flank of Line 3.) When Tarleton sends cavalry to attack Line 2 on its retreat, Washingtons cavalry makes surprise charge around hill on Line 3's left flank and scatters Tarleton's cavalry. (Note: Babits says that part of militia also retreated through center of Line 3 -- where a hole was temporarily opened for them.)

Note that the militia riflemen in Lines 1 and 2 inflicted heavy damage on the British. Babits notes that the "American rifle fire was incredibly effective". General Morgan said that the militia Line 2 ""gave them a heavy and galling fire."

3) As British line advances toward Line 3, each line fires. Tarleton orders his cavalry to attack Morgan's right flank but McDowell's skirmisher delays the British until Washington's cavalry can intervene. Tarleton orders his reserve behind his front line (71 st Highlanders) to attack Morgan's Right Flank on Line 3. Howard orders Virginia Continentals (under Wallace) on his right flank to swivel around on a diagonal to protect right flank. Order is misunderstood, Wallaces' unit retreats rearward about 100 yards, and rest of Line 3 follows. British line breaks into a charge. Suddenly , Line 3 turns arounds from retreat and lets British have it with a volley. Line 3 then charges with bayonet.

Center of British Line is disrupted and panics but 71st Highlanders continue attack on Morgan's right flank. Suddenly Pickens' militia of Lines 1 and 2, who have circled around the hill from Morgan's left flank to to his right flank, fall on the Highlanders from Morgan's right flank. Washington's Cavalry charges from the left. (Famous double envelopment). British infantry forces collapse in panic and surrender -- British cavalry flees , pursued by Washington. Babits (page 119) notes that "Only after the militia came back on the field did the 71st break .. the first instance of a Highland regiment running from the enemy." 4) Point is, the militia performed brilliantly and AS ORDERED. Not only did the militia weakened the British advance with two volleys and disrupted their attack on Morgan's right flank, the marksmen in Line 1 promoted the final panic in the British infantry by killing a number of British officers during the advance -- 18th century British infantry advanced into fire at the urging and threats of officers. McDowell's militia protected Morgan's right flank at a critical moment and Colonel Picken's militia units attacking at the crest broke the 71st Highlanders. Moreover, mounted militiamen made up one third of Washington's cavalry. Size of both armies was in neighborhood of 1000-1200 men? End result: British losses: 110 dead, over 200 wounded and 500 captured. Morgan loses: only 12 killed and 60 wounded. 5) Certainly Congress was pleased. Howard and Washington received medals. For his "spirited conduct" at Cowpens, the Continental Congress presented militia commander Pickens with a sword and the State of South Carolina promoted him to Brigadier-General in the state militia.(http://www.nps.gov/cowp/pickens.htm) Congress' kudos were not just for tactical genius. The mere existence of Morgan's army, along with British defeats at King's Mountain and Cowpens, convinced Southern patriots that they would prevail. It was a potent POLITICAL force for recruitment of militia, for resistance to British occupation, and it demoralized the Tories. This was within a year of a time when General Lincoln had lost almost the entire southern part of the Continental Army (almost 5000 men) in the defeat at Charleston and the Patriot cause had seemed lost in the South. The destruction of Tarleton's command removed Cornwallis's light, mobile troops. Later, Cornwallis would abandon his baggage trains in a desperate attempt to catch the nimble Army of Morgan and Greene. Eventually, with his army exhausted by hundreds of miles of futile marches chasing Greene, Cornwallis took refuge in the trap at Yorktown. 6) US Army still studies Cowpens and use of militia today: See training exercise at http://call.army.mil/products/ctc_bull/99-8/cowpens.htm . There have been damm few military units able to carry off a double envelopment -- Hannibal's destruction of the Romans at Cannae and Hindenburg at the Battle of Tannenberg are among the few rare examples. 7) What Bellesiles fails to mention is that roughly two thirds of Morgan's forces at Cowpens were militia --whose rifles had deadly accuracy compared to the muskets of British infantry and American Continentals. Consider the following eyewitness account from a British officer who fought at Cowpens: ********************** Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie served in the 71st (Frasier's) Highlanders at the battle of the Cowpens. After his return to England, he attacked his former commander, Tarleton, in the press. This letter appeared in the London Morning Chronicle on 9 August 1782.3 " You got yourself and your party completely ambuscaded, completely surrounded, upon all sides, by Mr. Morgan's rifle men. What was the consequence? The two detachments of British were made prisoners after a great slaughter was made among them, your legion dragoons were so broke by galling fire of rifle shot that your charging was in vain, till prudence, on your side, with about twenty men who were well mounted, made your retreat good, by leaving the remains of the poor blended legion in the hands of Mr. Morgan who I must say, though an enemy, showed great masterly abilities in this manoeuver." ******************* Source: US Army Command and General Staff College web site on Cowpens at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/CSIPUBS/Moncure/moncure.htm#staff ; Appendix E, item 2 (near bottom) 8) Based on the above, it hard for me to interpret Bellesiles's account as anything other than a dirty, underhanded and deceitful smear on men who gave their lives to free this country from British domination. In my opinion, Bellesiles' account is based not on objective historical research but on a need to lie about our history in order to justify a ban on gun possession by citizens.

Re: the Tocqueville observations I noted 3-5 messages back, here are a few more Bellesiles gems from "Arming America":

a) p. 309, para. 3, Bellesiles says:

"Travelers saw wastefulness...and many other traits,but somehow they just did not see the guns that were supposedly all around them. They especially did not notice all those young children learning to use a gun from infancy. One would think that such astute observers as Tocqueville would have noticed such things."

b) p. 149, bottom of para 2:

"The fable of the family musket kept above the mantel ready for use will just not pass muster."

(was pun intended?)

Re: Chapter Six of Bellesiles's "Arming America". In this chapter ("A People Numerous and Unarmed") Bellesiles spends a lot of time and text trying to show that the militia were ineffectual and worthless in the Revolutionary War. Bellesiles book does not have the tone of an objective study -- in which available data on a subject is presented and interpreted. Instead, Arming America has the tone of a political tract -- in this case, Bellesiles view of how Revolutionary War history occurred and selected anecdotes from obscure Revolutionary War figures to back up his sweeping anti-militia diatribes. He appears to be a gun control advocate determined to destroy the "myth of the citizen soldier" via a one-sided polemic disguised as objective historical research. The problem is that his descriptions of various major events are incomplete and often contrary to the picture given by historians who have studied specific battles in depth.

Bellesiles also seems very lacking in knowledge of military tactics, strategy, logistics, politics, Constraints imposed by economic forces, guerrilla warfare, and the nature of gaining popular support for political revolutions. A much more sophisticated view of the American Revolution is given by the US Army's Center for Military History -specifically , in its current edition of "American Military History" - see http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/amh-toc.htm . The Army's CMH also has a much more professional evaluation of American battles and the militia's role in them.

For example, on page 194-195, Bellesiles includes a lot of quotes from George Washington re: the shortfalls of the Militia. However, he fails to note that in 1776 (period of quotes) Washington was a politican with little military experience, that Washington's performance as general in the New York City campaign of 1776 was generally felt to be poor (he was learning on the job), and that part of Washington's griping was in part an Attempt to excuse American battle losses so that he wouldn't be relieved of command by Congress.

Bellesiles also doesn't consider that part of Washington's complaint was due to the militia not being under his control in the manner of the Continental Army and his desire to convert the militia into Continental Army units or at least to receive a lot more money and supplies from Congress and the States. Nor does Bellesiles mention that Washington's Continental Army frequently got it's behind kicked (New York , Brandywine, Philadelphia-Germantown, Monmouth,etc.) and that the Continental Army spent most of it's time camped outside the cities that the British occupied (Philadelphia, New York) -- able to do little more than block British forging parties.

Bellesiles makes a passing mention of Colonel John Stark's militia at Bennington, without mentioning that Stark's militia destroyed almost one tenth of Burgoyne's command. He also doesn't mention that the militia then fought at Saratoga and that their cutoff of Burgoyne's supply lines led to the strategic victory that convinced France and Spain to come into the war.

Except for Cowpens, Bellesiles makes no mention of the guerrilla war in the South. Yet US Army historians and Army officers still study the Southern Campaign and how it set Cornwallis up for the decisive defeat at Yorktown that won the war. After the southern part of the Continental Army was destroyed at Camden, the war in the South was carried out by guerrila bands led by Pickens, Francis Marion, Sumter,etc. General Nathanael Green, who took over from Gates, relied heavily on the militias to supplement his small Continental Army force while he tried to reconstitute his forces.

Bellesiles makes no mention of the southern militia's victory at King's Mountain in 1780 -- the victory in a year of despair that revitalized the Patriot cause and convinced the French king to give Congress a much-need loan.

Bellesiles and Garry Wills both seem lacking in an understanding of the major contribution made by the militia --or else they overlook the militia's contributions in order to promote their gun control agenda. Militia contributions were as follows: (a) they were cheap (b) they were ubiquitous (c) they kept the Tories in line and prevented the creation of a British puppet government. (d) they were impossible to suppress -- and hence ensured that Britain could never win the War.(e) they could defeat the British if sufficiently annoyed by British behavior

Regarding (a), the American economy and Congress could not support a large standing army -- even Washington's small Continental Army was starved and poorly equipped half the time. Consider the starvation and suffering of the roughly 11,000 men at Valley Forge in 1777-78. The problem was that Congress did not have the political power to raise tax revenues and so it printed money which quickly became worthless -plus the economy was Badly disrupted by war and the cutoff of trade. The US Army's American Military History notes:

"In the summer of 1780 the American cause seemed to be at as low an ebb as it had been after the New York campaign in 1776 or after the defeats at Ticonderoga and Brandywine in 1777. Defeat in the south was not the only discouraging aspect of patriot affairs. In the north a creeping paralysis had set in as the patriotic enthusiasm of the early war years waned. The Continental currency had virtually depreciated out of existence, and Congress was impotent to pay the soldiers or purchase supplies. At Morristown, New Jersey, in the winter of 1779-8O the army suffered worse hardships than at Valley Forge. Congress could do little but attempt to shift its responsibilities onto the states,… …Under such difficulties, Washington had to struggle to hold even a small Army together. Recruiting of Continentals, difficult to begin with, became almost impossible when the troops could neither be paid nor supplied adequately and had to suffer such winters as those at Morristown. Enlistments and drafts from the militia in 1780 produced not quite half as many men for one year's service as had enlisted in 1775 for three years or the duration. While recruiting lagged, morale among those men who had enlisted for the longer terms naturally fell. Mutinies in 1780 and 1781 were suppressed only by measures of great severity. … .Arnold's treason in September 1780 marked the nadir of the patriot cause…It was the frontier militia assembling "when they were about to be attacked in their own homes" who struck the blow that actually marked the turning point in the south"

Source: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-04.htm

Militia , were economically efficient -- they worked part time and fought only when the enemy was in the nearby area. Continental soldiers had to be fed and paid even when they spent months inactive in camps outside Philadelphia and New York.

Regarding (b), the British could not afford a large enough army to occupy the large American landmass -- they were in a constant quandry: If they dispersed their forces to occupy land area, then the militias would kill small units and cut supply lines. If the British concentrated their forces, then they only had control over a small area. A conventional force like Washinton's Continental Army may be destroyed on the battlefield by another conventional force of the same size--by contrast, a guerrilla force gives no "center of gravity " that can be attacked -- it generally takes a conventional force of up to 5 times the number of guerrillas to totally suppress a guerrilla force. King George III simply did not have the money and manpower to suppress the North American guerrillas --especially with France, Holland, and Spain waiting to attack England if English forces were too weakened by the American campaign - just as the Soviet Union and China were waiting to move in other areas of the world if the US committed too many forces to Vietnam. The militia used local concealed supplies -- King George had to pay to ship soldiers and supplies across the Atlantic. After several years, British people were fed up with theexpense and the British government was voted out.

Regarding (c), the militia kept the Tories intimidated and prevented the British from ever setting up a puppet government - something the British hoped to do in the South in order to reduce the demand and expense of maintaining British troops in occupied areas. A fairly nasty, underground war was fought between Tories and Patriots in the South -- the Patriot won. Just like in Vietnam, where the Vietcong underground cut off grass roots support for the South Vietnamese government in Saigon and made US "Vietnamization " a failure.

The common British soldiers often abused American civilians -- the Patriot partisans , by avenging mistreatment and by their mere existence, propagated the POLITICAL ideas of resistance, of individual rights, and of freedom -- and help politically convert many American civilians over to the idea of Independence. This translated into sabotage of British supplies, superior intelligence networks for the Patriots , covert civilians supplies to the partisans,etc. Given that British forces only numbered around roughly 30,000 men and that American population was around 2.5 million, "hearts and minds" mattered.

Regarding (d) the Patriot guerrillas could live off the land --stay dispersed in small groups in the Mountains, swamps, and forests - only to assemble in large formations at unexpected locations in unpredictable attacks. Even if defeated in conventional battle, they simply melted away and then reappeared later. Their retreats were not always due to lack of courage -- their rifle had greater range/accuracy than muskets but had no bayonet with which to block a British charge -- sniper tactics made more sense.

Both Continental Army and militia were necessary to win the war -- most major Patriot victories (Saratoga, Southern campaign battles at Cowpens, Guildford Court House,etc.) occurred when the Patriot general was smart enough to make use of both.

US Army historians recognize the above even if Bellesiles and Garry Wills apparently do not. But then, mere academics with a narrow specialty usually don't have an understanding of military tactics, of military strategy , of the economic considerations of warfare, and of high politics/diplomacy. Read Chapter 6 of Bellesiles and then read the Army's history of the Revolution at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-03.htm and http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-04.htm.

Consider An extract from the latter reference:

"The militia, the men who fought battles and then went home, also exhibited this spirit on many occasions. The militiamen have been generally maligned as useless by one school of thought, and glorified by another as the true victors in the war. In any balanced view it must be recognized that their contributions were great, though they would have counted for little without a Continental Army to give the American cause that continued sustenance that only a permanent force in being could give it. It was the ubiquity of the militia that made British victories over the Continentals in the field so meaningless. And the success with which the militia did operate derived from the firm political control the patriots had established over the countryside long before the British were in any position to challenge it-the situation that made the British task so difficult in the first place. "