Man on the Moon: The U.S. Space Program as a Cold War Maneuver

Rita G. Koman

Reprinted from the OAH Magazine of History
8 (Winter 1994). ISSN 0882-228X
Copyright (c) 1994, Organization of American Historians
 

"Houston, Tranquility Base here, the Eagle has landed," Neil Armstrong announced (1). On 20 July 1969, he told the universe by way of Mission Control that the Apollo II lunar module had landed safely on the moon. When Armstrong took his historic first steps for mankind on the lunar surface, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) realized it had triumphed over the U.S.S.R. in the Cold War space race and had fulfilled the national mandate established by President John F. Kennedy in 1961.

Kennedy, after a thorough investigation by an appointed Space Council chaired by Vice President Lyndon Johnson, decided to "shift our efforts in space from low to high gear" in order to maintain a positive image of world leadership (2). At that time, NASA was a fledgling three-year old agency struggling to create a top-notch national space program with limited funds. Earlier, a presidential transition task force led by Science Advisor Jerome Wiesner warned Kennedy about the potential military dangers and disadvantages to the West if the Soviet space lead went unchallenged. Intrinsic to the warning was the fear that other nations would assume that such a lead in space implied a lead in the building of missile weapons as well.

To Kennedy, the political and psychological impact of being considered second-rate or in second place was inconsistent with national security, the U.S. role as a world leader, and his vision of a New Frontier for Americans. Thus, in a dramatic statement in his second State of the Union message of May, 1961, he pledged the United States would land a man on the moon and return him safely to earth "before the decade is out" (3). Believing that such an accomplishment would require the contributions of the entire nation, Kennedy made the space program the "highest kind of national priority" (4). Historically, the space program became the embodiment and expression of America's core national values and aspirations (5).

In 1950, an Army team stationed in Huntsville, Alabama led by German expatriate Werner von Braun built upon the pioneer achievements of Robert Goddard by developing a series of Redstone rockets. These were tested at Cape Canaveral Air Force base for structure and performance while Air Force personnel nearby worked to perfect the Atlas, the first U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (6).

Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. also had a team of German expatriate scientists working on rockets and missiles. On the heels of their success in producing an atomic bomb in 1949 and long-range bombers in the early 1950s, the Soviets successfully tested an H-bomb (1954) and were mass producing the medium-range ballistic missile, SS-3. By 1957, they had fired an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of over five thousand miles. American officials were shocked by the speed at which these accomplishments occurred, but the American public became fully aware of the Soviet potential only after the successful launching of Sputnik. The first artificial space satellite was sent into orbit with the same rocket engine as the SS-3 on 4 October 1957. Two hundred thousand pounds of thrust had propelled the two hundred pound spacecraft into orbit. The Soviets now had the ability to deliver a nuclear warhead anyplace in the world (7).

The apparent vulnerability of U.S. cities and bomber forces to Soviet attack shocked American officials into forcing a speedup to close the "missile gap" and launch an American satellite (8). The twin securities of monopolistic possession of nuclear armaments and extensive multilateral economic assistance that maintained international U.S. power in the late 1940s were now definitely gone (9). The boldness of Soviet scientists demanded more risk-taking on the part of American scientists and creative militaristic directions to match their initiatives. The Army's first satellite launch failed but a second attempt sent Explorer 1 up successfully on 31 January 1958. Reflecting the public concern that action be taken, President Dwight Eisenhower submitted a bill to Congress that was quickly passed and signed into law in late July, creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). That October, NASA began consolidation of all of the nation's diverse programs and interests in space exploration under its auspices. Included as one of NASA's major responsibilities was the development of a program to put a man in orbit (10).

Within two months of its establishment, NASA launched Project Mercury, a manned space program. In April 1961, however, one month before the well publicized launch of Alan Shepard into space, Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gargarin was launched without fanfare and orbited around the earth (11). Once again the Soviets had upstaged the Americans and they bragged about it internationally. Newly inaugurated President Kennedy vowed that "this generation of Americans intends to be the 'world's leading spacefaring nation'" (12). He obtained congressional support to double the space budget, and the program to put a man on the moon went into high gear.

There is little doubt now that the project to put a man on the moon was a key maneuver in Kennedy's Cold War strategy. By giving NASA programs top priority, his actions essentially played on American fears of communism and implicitly inferred that the Eisenhower administration had not done enough to meet the Sputnik challenge. Too many Americans were beginning to feel a need to vindicate the "long-standing communist boast that theirs was the superior system for galvanizing human productivity" (13). Kennedy did not want to see the Soviets get to the moon first and govern it with "a hostile flag of conquest" when American scientists and technology could put "a banner of freedom and peace" there leading to "knowledge and understanding . . . for the progress of all people" (14). That the man on the moon project ranked high on defense and ideology priorities was bore out by a memo from Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and NASA Director James Webb to Kennedy in May, 1961 stating: "It is vital to establish specific missions aimed at [building] national prestige" (15). Kennedy also carried the additional burden of redeeming himself after his recent Bay of Pigs debacle. The Eisenhower plan, which aimed simply to orbit a man in space, now grew to also include bringing him safely back.

In the 1960s, NASA became the instrument to project the American international image of a "pioneering, technologically advanced, risk-taking, high-achievement society." It was a "feel good about yourself" propaganda program for Americans (16). After Kennedy's untimely assassination, the project took on the aura of near-sacredness as President Johnson pushed for its completion in the name of the slain president in spite of growing skepticism from many scientists who felt unmanned flights would accomplish more scientifically (17). In order to accomplish Kennedy's mandate before the decade was out, however, the man on the moon program reorganized the space operations into three phases: Project Mercury, with six missions into outer space; Project Gemini, an intermediate program; and Apollo, the largest and most ambitious of the three (18).

The most celebrated highlight of the entire program was Armstrong's Apollo 11 moon walk on 20 July 1969 when J.F.K.'s New Frontier vision was realized by beaming the action back to earth through international television satellites. Apollo had six additional moon landings, however, that continued until 1972. The Apollo project was also responsible for the launching of Skylab and a docking exercise with the Soviet ship Soyez, a welcomed 1975 thaw in the Cold War (19).

As the space program grew in sophistication and accreditation in the 1970s, NASA began to feel a greater tightening of its budget belt. The Soviets had been surpassed and the international recognition of American ingenuity and technology accomplished. Questions were raised only about the feasibility of government sponsored technological developments as U.S. financial and military involvement in Vietnam escalated and changed the public's focus. A scaled-back version of endeavors designed to provide scientific information and breakthroughs under cost-effective regulations that could be justified became the new modus operatum (20).

An analysis of the success of the space program as a Cold War maneuver must consider numerous factors. From a psychological standpoint, the program unquestionably boosted national self-esteem and American pride to an all-time high at the time of the first moon landing. It provided a ray of hope shining on an otherwise gloomy landscape. This was especially true in late 1968. During this period, Americans witnessed their nation's international stature plummet over the Vietnam buildup in general and specifically over the Tet Offensive of 1 January 1968. Additionally, the assassinations of Martin Luther King (April) and Robert Kennedy (June) on the heels of Tet and the riots and burning of many inner cities caused many Americans to question what their nation really represented. The Apollo 11 landing on the moon and Neil Armstrong's walk provided a needed boost to morale. Thus, a swell of pride over the man on the moon project's success was indeed a pleasant reprieve to savor and seemed to serve as a reminder for Americans of their basic national values. By the mid-seventies, the U.S.S.R. did become more receptive to American overtures for cooperative exchange of scientific data. Downplaying the missile buildup after the Cuban Crisis allowed Soviet space operations to become a type of comfort zone within the on-going Cold War scenario.

One cannot, however, ignore the fact that the race to put a man on the moon became a part of the general arms race with the Soviets. To achieve the successes of the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo missions, acceleration costs of space efforts rose. At the same time that the nation geared up to escalate the Vietnam involvement, NASA was operating at break-neck speed to reach the moon. Unquestionably, speed blinded those involved to potential dangers of cutting corners and stressing manned flights rather than those devoted to scientific development. While every flight added a building block, enabling a successful finale for all of the projects, there was a pricetag. The strict adherence to a 1970 deadline goaded in large measure by Cold War posturing literally blew up in NASA's face when the flash fire of 27 January 1967 took the lives of three astronauts. It also gave voice overtly to critics who attacked NASA for speed they felt unjustified even by Cold War conditions. In retrospect, there were 33 flights involving 59 astronauts, some of whom took repeated trips, with the approximate cost of $392.6 million for Mercury, $1.3 billion for Gemini, and $25 billion for Apollo. No dollar amount can be placed on the lives of the three astronauts lost in the 1967 flashfire of Apollo 2 (21). The continuing contribution of communication and weather satellites, scientific experimentation and knowledge gathered from flights, and the multitude of other spinoffs from NASA operatives, while difficult to calculate in dollars and cents value, should also be kept in mind (22).

With the conclusion of the Cold War, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. will be able to maintain the space program, given its economic implications. In the meantime, NASA needs to put into focus one of its greatest challenges as it redefines its vision and realizes its creative edge while the nation moves toward the twenty-first century (23).

1. To understand the impact of the Cold War on the space program.
   
2. To analyze space program goals in relation to expanding Cold War endeavors in Southeast Asia.
   
3. To evaluate the significance of the space program in meeting national Cold War goals.
   

1. Take a quick survey for general knowledge about the space program by asking students what they know about it.

2. Reproduce and provide copies of above information beginning with “Background” up to “Examining Outcomes” for students to read. Then ask students:

1. What made Ameri-cans so shocked and fearful about early Soviet space accomplishments?
   
2. Why was President Kennedy determined to make the space program a political rather than a purely scientific endeavor?
   
3. Why do you think the space program was able to sustain positive support from the public in spite of the controversies emanating from Vietnam and civil rights issues?
   

3. Briefly explain that while NASA’s positive and highly publicized profile for the Space Program made Americans proud, there were critics who became especially vocal after Apollo 2’s disastrous fire. Then provide students with reproduced copies of Documents 1, 2, and 3 to read and analyze. Some questions to ask might include:

a. Document 1:

1. What does Lippmann think is NASA’s central objective?
   
2. What does Lippmann think NASA’s purpose should be?
   
3. What claim does the scientist Lovell make according to Lippmann?
   
4. How do Lippmann’s views oppose Cold War objectives?
   

b. Document 2:

1. What earlier indications pointed to possible cover-up of problems at NASA?
   
2. Who does the article blame?
   
3. What does the cartoon mean?
   
4. Do you think sabotage of Cold War goals was involved?
   

c. Document 3:

1. What is the main argument made by Dreher?
   
2. Is there a policy conflict between arms and space producers?
   
3. What social problems are introduced that Dreher thinks might be better aided by NASA programs?
   
4. Was the U.S. spread too thin by all of these Cold War activities?
   

4. Provide students the dollars and cents information of Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo by listing it on the chalk board. Add in the three lives of the lost astronauts with question marks. Have students figure an approximate total. Then ask them to evaluate the program's significance as a Cold War maneuver:

1. Was the goal President Kennedy defined worthwhile to pursue?
   
2. Was it beneficial? To whom? For the nation? The world?
   
3. Should this program have been shelved in favor of increasing the Southeast Asian War budget?
   
   

Note: The space program, largely overlooked in textbooks, can be discussed as part of a general review of the Cold War period. See the chronology of Cold War and Space Program on page 46. Allocation of one or two class periods should be considered adequate unless related activities are pursued.

1. Have students complete research and either give an oral report to the class or write a written report on:

1. One or more of the first astronauts and what they did.
   
2. One of NASA's sixteen installations around the country.
   
3. The Challenger explosion of 1986.
   
4. Current programs--what they are, costs, manned v. unmanned crafts.
   

2. Have students interview a parent or older person who can describe what they were doing and thinking on the day that the arrival of the first man on the moon was televised.

3. Take a field trip to a NASA installation if nearby.

4. Invite a former or current astronaut to visit with classes about their space experiences if possible.

5. Show a NASA video on space travel. (See Bibliography for NASA address.)

6. Stage a debate on whether space exploration continues to be viable and/or cost effective today.

7. Plan an interdisciplinary lesson with science and math departments. (NASA has information to help do this.)

1. NASA, NASA Facts: Mission Control Center (Houston: L. B. Johnson Space Center, 1986), 1.

2. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 525.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 526.

5. Peter Carlson, "Is NASA Necessary?", The Washington Post Magazine (Washington: The Washington Post, 1993), May 30, 1993, p.22.

6. National Park Service, Man in Space Study of Alternatives (Denver: Denver Service Center, 1986), 17-18.

7. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 387-88.

8. Ibid., 388.

9. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 498-99.

10. National Park Service, 19.

11. Ibid.

12. Sorensen, 528.

13. T.A. Heppenheimer, "Lost in Space--What Went Wrong With NASA?" American Heritage 43 (November 1992): 62.

14. Sorensen, 529.

15. Carlson, 23.

16. Ibid.

17. William O'Neill, Coming Apart (New York: Times Books, 1971), 52.

18. NASA, The Early Years: Mercury to Apollo-Soyez (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 1-7.

19. Ibid.

20. Heppenheimer, 64-68.

21. The Early Years, 2-7.

22. NASA, Spinoff, 1991 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991).

23. Carlson, 27.

Anderson, Frank W., Jr. Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 1915-1980. Washington D.C.: NASA, 1981.

Beggs, James M. Our First Quarter Century of Achievement--Just the Beginning. Washington D.C.: NASA, 1983.

Heppenheimer, T.A., "Lost in Space--What Went Wrong With NASA?", American Heritage (Vol. 43, #7, November, 1992), p.62.

McCurdy, Howard E. Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in the American Space Program. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Educational Publications Service, LEP, Washington, D.C. 20546.

Von Braun, Wernher and Frederick I. Ordway. History of Rocket and Space Travel. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975.

Wilford, John Noble. We Reach the Moon: The New York Times Story of Man's Greatest Adventure. New York: Bantam Books, 1969.

Wolfe, Tom. The Right Stuff. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1979.

Rita G. Koman taught American history and government for seventeen years. She currently lives in Manassas, Virginia where she works as an educational consultant.