Introduction

My United States history and American government survey classes at Berkeley High School are quite heterogeneous in both ability and ethnic background. Approximately 25 percent of my students are African American. Another 25 percent are likely to be Asian or Latino. I am constantly seeking ways to make the survey course relevant to their past so as to engage them more fully in their study of American history and government. A continuing problem has been a tendency on the part of many texts to portray minorities merely as victims, a process that inevitably leads to a not so subtle dehumanization of their role in history and makes more difficult explanation of the “sudden” outburst of minority protest movements in the mid-twentieth century.

As part of my effort to counteract this trend, I introduce my students to two federal court cases involving Asian immigrants’ efforts to guarantee their rights. I begin with a brief look at a remarkable case involving Chinese Americans, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). I follow this with a contrasting lesson on one Japanese American’s use of the federal courts in his struggle for citizenship, using the case of Takao Ozawa. Unlike the Chinese and African American model of successfully using the courts to assert constitutional rights in cases such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) or Brown v. Board (1954), Takao Ozawa’s case was hindered by the Court’s basing its decision on a strict interpretation of a federal statute rather than broad interpretation of language in the United States Constitution.

The Takao Ozawa lesson is designed to explore this distinction. As such, the lesson could also be useful in American government courses. Besides reviewing and illustrating the functions of the Supreme Court in interpreting federal statutes as opposed to the Constitution, it also reveals methods of judicial interpretation such as the doctrine of Original Intent, literalism, and stare decisis. Finally the lesson points to the vital interplay between Congress and the federal judiciary in the making of law. Prior to using either Yick Wo or the Ozawa documents, I discuss the structure of state and federal courts, as well as the process by which the Supreme Court makes its decisions. An indispensable teaching reference for this task is Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker’s Constitutional Law For A Changing America: A Short Course.

While most useful in their present form for Advanced Placement or honors courses, both lessons entail a personal quest for justice and so should pique interest in regular classes as well. With adequate vocabulary cues and encouragement in the use of primary documents as detective work, the documents can be successfully adapted for use in heterogeneous American history or government classes. An inspiring teaching reference for making this effort is James West Davidson and Mark Hamilton Lytle’s After the Fact: The Art of Historical Detection.

Objectives

Background

In a ground-breaking work, In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle against Discrimination in Nineteenth Century America, Charles J. McClain has given us a major tool to explore the active role that Chinese Americans played in asserting their constitutional rights. Chinese contributions to the building of the transcontinental railroad and white hostility to the Chinese presence are where the familiarity of most Americans with the Chinese ends. Most accounts focus almost exclusively on the reaction that Chinese immigration provoked among the white population. Typically, as Roger Daniels has put it, “Other immigrant groups were celebrated for what they had accomplished; Orientals were important for what was done to them.”

Yet far from hunkering down in Chinatown, a race apart, docile and ignorant of American institutions, the Chinese were actively engaged in fighting against a multitude of actions designed to destroy their capability of living in this country. McClain’s thesis is “that the conventional wisdom concerning the Chinese and their supposed political backwardness needs to be stood on its head. The nineteenth-century Chinese-American community may have been more isolated from mainstream society than other immigrant groups in certain respects, but lack of political consciousness was not one of its distinguishing characteristics.” McClain’s account offers

...abundant evidence that the leaders of the nineteenth-century Chinese community and many other Chinese as well were thoroughly familiar with American governmental institutions, the courts in particular, and knew how to use those institutions to protect themselves. Far from being passive or docile in the face of official mistreatment they reacted with indignation to it and more often than not sought redress in the courts. Indeed, during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Chinese mounted court challenges to virtually every governmentally imposed disability under which they labored.

McClain concludes that “To ignore Chinese legal initiatives is, as well to ignore an important fact of U.S. Constitutional history in general. The cases brought by the Chinese raised immensely interesting questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation. Many of them contributed significantly to the molding of American constitutional jurisprudence” (1). McClain has shown clearly that the Chinese from earliest days were in fact keenly aware both of their political surroundings and of American governmental institutions, and were actively pursuing their rights in sophisticated ways (2).

Procedure

Lesson I — Yick Wo

Yick Wo was a native of China and came to California in 1861. He had continuously operated a laundry at the same location in San Francisco for twenty-two years. Local law required permits concerning proper drainage and fire safety for laundries, and Yick Wo had previously received such certificates from the health officer and the Board of Fire Wardens. In the summer of 1885, local authorities began to deny these permits to Chinese launderers by enforcing Order 1569, passed by the Board of Supervisors in 1880. The ordinance prohibited the operation of laundries in wooden buildings without the permission of the Board of Supervisors. Of the two hundred Chinese who applied for the permit, none were granted, while all but one Caucasian were granted permits. Yick Wo was among several Chinese arrested and convicted for operating a laundry without the required certificate.

Yick Wo’s attorneys argued his case in federal court. On 10 May 1886, Justice Stanley Matthews handed down the decision of the court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Wo Lee v. Hopkins (Hopkins was the San Francisco sheriff who had incarcerated Yick Wo and Wo Lee, the petitioners). Here is Order No. 1569 prescribing the kind of buildings in which laundries may be located.

Order No. 1569:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful, from and after the passage of this order, for any person or persons to establish, maintain, or carry on a laundry within the corporate limits of the city and county of San Francisco without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed either of brick or stone.

Justice Matthews’s Opinion for a Unanimous Court:

...It is contended on the part of the petitioners, that the ordinances for violations of which they are severally sentenced to imprisonment, are void on their face, as being within the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment; and, in the alternative, if not so, that they are void by reason of their administration, operating unequally, so as to punish in the present petitioners what is permitted to others as lawful, without any distinction of circumstances an unjust and illegal discrimination, it is claimed, which, though not made expressly by the ordinances is made possible by them.

When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power....But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of the commonwealth ‘may be a government of laws and not of men.’ For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.

...For the cases present the ordinances in actual operation, and the facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances, as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their administration, and thus representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. This principle of interpretation has been sanctioned by this court in Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370; and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703.

...The present cases, as shown by the facts disclosed in the record, are within this class. It appears that both petitioners have complied with every requisite, deemed by the law or by the public officers charged with its administration, necessary for the protection of neighboring property from fire, or as a precaution against injury to the public health. No reason whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is assigned why they should not be permitted to carry on, in the accustomed manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood. And while this consent of the supervisors is withheld from them and from two hundred others who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business under similar conditions. The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not justified. The discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The imprisonment of the petitioners is, therefore, illegal, and they must be discharged.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of California in the case of Yick Wo, and that of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California in the case of Wo Lee, are severally reversed, and the cases remanded, each to the proper court, with directions to discharge the petitioners from custody and imprisonment.

Questions for Student Discussion:

1. Hall McAllister, who argued for Yick Wo, was at the time of this case one of California’s most distinguished attorneys. Who do you think paid his fees?
2. What reasons are given by Justice Matthews for his decision to release Yick Wo and Wo Lee?
3. What is Justice Matthews interpreting when making his decision—a law passed by Congress, the U.S. Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, or Order No. 1569? Explain why his interpretation is a strict or loose interpretation.
4. What relevance does Order No. 1569 have to the application of the facts to the U.S. Constitution? What dramatic language does Justice Matthews use to describe the enforcement of Order No. 1569?
5. How does Justice Matthews apply the facts of the case as stated in the petitioners’ briefs to the Constitution? How does he interpret the phrase “pursuit of happiness” from the Declaration of Independence? What bearing does this interpretation have on his decision?
6. Refer to the exact language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Does it seem to matter that Yick Wo and Wo Lee are “subjects of China?” Why or why not?
7. How did many Americans view foreigners in the 1880s? What events at the time were affecting this attitude?
8. Review what you have learned about Jacksonian democracy. What language does Justice Matthews use that illustrates the influence of Jackson’s ideas of economic freedom, or more precisely, freedom from economic discrimination by government?
9. Which seems to be more important in determining Justice Matthews’s decision—race or economics (job opportunity)? What language does Justice Matthews use in reference to each?

Lesson II — Takao Ozawa

Part A — Takao Ozawa
Article I, section VII, clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress has the power “to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.” Constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin has noted, “There seems to be no good reason why two such entirely different subjects should be dealt with in the same clause other than that legislation regarding each has to be ‘uniform.’” However, naturalization laws for the United States have not always been “uniform” as required by the U.S. Constitution. Congress has the sole power to determine who may become naturalized citizens.

The first Naturalization Act of 1790 limited the right of becoming a naturalized citizen to “free white persons.” Subsequent enactments, legislated during the course of the nineteenth century, all included this racial condition. After the Civil War, the Naturalization Act of 1870 extended the right of naturalization to former slaves, making aliens of African birth and persons of African descent also eligible.

Section 2169 of Title XXX of the Revised Federal Statutes of 1875 (which governed immigration) would affect Japanese legal efforts to win the right to citizenship. This section specified that racially only two types of aliens, persons of white or black descent, were eligible to become American citizens. Being neither white nor black, Japanese immigrants, along with other Asian immigrants, were classified as “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” seemingly without the right of naturalization. In 1906 Congress passed further naturalization legislation that attempted to standardize the procedures for becoming a citizen.

Until 1906 when the U.S. Attorney General—claiming authority under the new naturalization law—ended the practice, the ambiguous meaning of the term “free white person” had made it possible for some lower federal courts to issue naturalization papers to approximately 420 Japanese. Enactment of the 1913 and 1920 California Alien Land Laws made naturalization rights for Japanese even more compelling. The laws effectively prohibited “aliens ineligible to citizenship” from owning or leasing land, thus jeopardizing the livelihood of thousands of Japanese farming families.

Takao Ozawa was born June 15, 1875, a native of Kanagawa Prefecture in Japan. He came to America as a young student in 1894. Working as a schoolboy, he graduated from high school and attended college for three years until 1906, after which he discontinued his studies, and moved to Honolulu where he settled. He worked for an American company and was well thought of by his fellow workers for his moral character.

He had long wanted to become an American citizen, but was barred from doing so by American immigration laws that disallowed Asians from becoming citizens. Six other Japanese Americans had previously challenged naturalization statutes in U.S. District Courts and lost [Chuman, 67-71]. In 1916, Mr. Ozawa continued this effort by indirectly challenging the constitutionality of the naturalization law in U.S. District Court by simply arguing that he should be considered as a person, an individual with the moral character necessary to become an American citizen.

Excerpts from one of Takao Ozawa’s two legal briefs:

I neither drink liquor of any kind, nor smoke, nor play cards, nor gamble, nor associate with any improper person. My honesty and my industriousness are well known among my Japanese and American acquaintances and friends; and I am always trying my best to conduct myself according to the Golden Rule. So I have all [the] confidence in myself that as far as my character is concerned, I am second to none.

...In name, General Benedict Arnold was an American, but at heart he was a traitor. In name, I am not an American, but at heart I am a true American. I set forth the following facts that will sufficiently prove this. 1) I did not report my name, my marriage, or the names of my children to the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu; notwithstanding all Japanese subjects are requested to do so. These matters were reported to the American government. 2) I do not have any connection with any Japanese churches or schools, or any Japanese organizations here or elsewhere. 3) I am sending my children to an American church and American school in place of a Japanese one. 4) Most of the time I use the American (English) language at home, so that my children cannot speak the Japanese language. 5) I have lived continuously within the United States for over twenty-eight years. 6) I chose as my wife one educated in American schools...so it is my honest hope to do something good to the United States before I bid a farewell to this world

—Takao Ozawa, “Naturalization of a Japanese Subject,” undated brief, University of California, Los Angeles Japanese American Research Project Collection, Japanese Foreign Ministry Documents, reel 39.

Questions for Student Discussion:

Part B — Takao Ozawa
On March 25, 1916, Judge Charles Clemons for the U.S. District Court for the Territory of Hawaii denied Ozawa’s claim.

Excerpt from Judge Clemons’s Decision:

The court finds that the petitioner is not qualified under Revised Statutes, section 2169, and must therefore deny his petition; and it is so ordered, in spite of the finding hereby made that he has fully established the allegation of his petition, and, except as to the requirements of section 2169, is in every way eminently qualified under the statutes to become an American citizen.

—San Francisco Consulate General, Documental History of Law Cases Affecting Japanese in the United States, 1916-1924, I, 8-9.

Questions for Student Discussion:

Part C — Takao Ozawa
When Ozawa appealed the court’s decision, judges in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (which included the territory of Hawaii) asked the U.S. Supreme Court for guidance on two questions:

1. Is the Naturalization Act of 1906 complete in itself or is it modified and limited by the provisions of section 2169 of the Revised Statutes of 1875?
2. If so limited, is Ozawa, who is of the “Japanese race,” eligible to U.S. citizenship under that section?
   In 1922, the Supreme Court sought to resolve these questions in hearing Ozawa v. the United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). Japanese American interest groups hired George W. Wickersham, a former United States Attorney General, to argue Ozawa’s case. Solicitor General Beck argued the government’s position.

Selections from the unanimous majority opinion written by Justice George Sutherland:

First. Section 2169 is found in title XXX of the Revised Statutes, under the heading “Naturalization,” and reads as follows: “The provisions of this title shall apply to aliens [being free white persons and to aliens] of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”

The Act of June 29, 1906, entitled “An Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and to Provide for a Uniform Rule for the Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States,” consists of thirty-one sections, and deals primarily with the subject of procedure. There is nothing in the circumstances leading up to or accompanying the passage of the act which suggests that any modification of section 2169, or of its application, was contemplated.

The report of the House Committee on Naturalization and Immigration, recommending its passage, contains this statement:

“It is the opinion of your committee that the frauds and crimes which have been committed in regard to naturalization have resulted more from a lack of any uniform system of procedure in such matters than from any radical defect in the fundamental principles of existing law governing in such matters. The two changes which the committee has recommended...are as follows: First: The requirement that before an alien can be naturalized he must be able to read, either in his own language or in the English language, and to speak or understand the English language; and second: that the alien must intend to reside permanently in the United States before he shall be entitled to naturalization.”

This seems to make it quite clear that no change of the fundamental character here involved was in mind.

Section 26 of the act expressly repeals sections 2165, 2167, 2168, 2173 of title XXX., the subject-matter thereof being covered by new provisions. The sections of title XXX. remaining without repeal are: Section 2166, relating to honorably discharged soldiers; section 2169, now under consideration; section 2170, requiring five years’ residence prior to admission; section 2171, forbidding the admission of alien enemies; section 2172, relating to the status of children of naturalized persons; and section 2174, making special provision in respect of the naturalization of seamen....

In all of the Naturalization Acts, from 1790 to 1906, the privilege of naturalization was confined to white persons (with the addition in 1870 of those of African nativity and descent), although the exact wording of the various statutes was not always the same. If Congress, in 1906, desired to alter a rule so well and so long established, it may be assumed that its purpose would have been definitely disclosed and its legislation to that end put in unmistakable terms.

The argument [made by Mr. Wickersham, Ozawa’s attorney] that, because section 2169 is in terms made applicable only to the title in which it is found, it should now be confined to the unrepealed sections of that title, is not convincing. The persons entitled to naturalization under these unrepealed sections include only honorably discharged soldiers and seamen who have served three years on board an American vessel, both of whom were entitled from the beginning to admission on more generous terms than were accorded to other aliens. It is not conceivable that Congress would deliberately have allowed the racial limitations to continue as to soldiers and seamen, to whom the statute had accorded an especially favored status, and have removed it as to all other aliens. Such a construction cannot be adopted unless it is unavoidable....

It is the duty of this court to give effect to the intent of Congress. Primarily this intent is ascertained by giving the words their natural significance; but if this leads to an unreasonable result, plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole, we must examine the matter further....It is inconceivable that a rule in force from the beginning of the government a part of our history as well as our law, welded into the structure of our national polity by a century of legislative and administrative acts and judicial decisions would have been deprived of its force in such dubious and casual fashion. We are therefore, constrained to hold that the Act of 1906 is limited by the provisions of section 2169 of the Revised Statutes.

Second. This brings us to inquire whether, under section 2169, the appellant is eligible to naturalization. The language of the Naturalization Laws from 1790 to 1870 had been uniformly such as to deny the privilege of naturalization to an alien unless he came within the description “free white person.” By section 7 of the Act of July 14, 1870, the Naturalization Laws were “extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”...Is the appellant therefore, a “free white person,” within the meaning of that phrase as found in the statute?

On behalf of the appellant it is urged that we should give to this phrase the meaning which it had in the minds of its original framers in 1790, and that it was employed by them for the sole purpose of excluding the black or African race and the Indians then inhabiting this country. It may be true that these two races were alone thought of as being excluded, but to say that they were the only ones would be to ignore the affirmative form of the legislation. The provision is not that Negroes and Indians shall be excluded, but it is, in effect, that only free white persons shall be included. The intention was to confer the privilege of citizenship upon that class of persons whom the fathers knew as white, and to deny it to all who could not be so classified. It is not enough to say that the framers did not have in mind the brown or yellow races of Asia....If it be assumed that the opinion of the framers was that the only persons who would fall outside the designation “white” were Negroes and Indians, this would go no farther than to demonstrate their lack of sufficient information to enable them to foresee precisely who would be excluded by that term in the subsequent administration of the statute. It is not important, in construing their words, to consider the extent of their ethnological knowledge, or whether they thought that, under the statute, the only persons who would be denied naturalization would be Negroes and Indians. It is sufficient to ascertain whom they intended to include; and, having ascertained that, it follows, as a necessary corollary, that all others are to be excluded.

The question, then is, Who are comprehended within the phrase “free white persons?” Undoubtedly the word “free” was originally used in recognition of the fact that slavery then existed, and that some white persons occupied that status. The word, however, has long since ceased to have any practical significance and may now be disregarded.

We have been furnished with elaborate briefs in which the meaning of the words “white person” is discussed with ability and length, both from the standpoint of judicial decision and from that of the science of ethnology. It does not seem to us necessary, however, to follow counsel in their extensive researches in these fields....Manifestly the test afforded by the mere color of the skin of each individual is impracticable, as that differs greatly among persons of the same race, even among Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations from the fair blond to the swarthy brunette, the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of the brown or yellow races....

The determination that the words “white persons” are synonymous with the words “a person of the Caucasian race” simplifies the problem, although it does not entirely dispose of it. Controversies have arisen and will no doubt arise again in respect of the proper classification of individuals in border-line cases....

The appellant in the case now under consideration, however, is clearly of a race which is not Caucasian....A large number of Federal and state courts have so decided, and we find no reported case definitely to the contrary. These decisions are sustained by numerous scientific authorities, which we do not deem it necessary to review. We think these decisions are right, and so hold.

The briefs filed on behalf of appellant refer in complimentary terms to the culture and enlightenment of the Japanese people, and with this estimate we have no reason to disagree; but these are matters which cannot enter into our consideration of the questions here at issue. We have no function in the matter other than to ascertain the will of Congress and declare it. Of course, there is not implied either in the legislation or in our interpretation of it any suggestion of individual unworthiness or racial inferiority. These considerations are in no matter involved.

Questions for Student Discussion:

Teacher Notes for Ozawa

Regarding Part B, question 4: In both 1862 and again in 1918 Congress offered the right of naturalization to “all aliens” who had honorably served in the U.S. armed forces. One war veteran, Ichizo Sato, was naturalized by a federal court in Hawaii in 1923 for his army service, but when he tried to register to vote in Sacramento, California, he was refused. He sued and lost his right to naturalization when the California Supreme Court decided that citizenship matters were a congressional prerogative, and federal courts had no authority to extend the provisions of naturalization laws. See Wilson and Hosokawa, Ch. XVI.

If this document is used in a U.S. government class, Part C, question 7 provides an opportunity to explore the role of obiter dicta in judicial decision-making. See Epstein and Walker, 33. Epstein and Walker are also useful for discussing Part C, question 12.

Legacy of the Ozawa case. Takao Ozawa and thousands of other Asians were rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court for citizenship purely on racial grounds. By upholding their ineligibility, the high court guaranteed that the powerless political status of Japanese and other Asian immigrants would remain unchanged. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the issue of naturalization rights for Asian immigrants came into focus. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 explicitly prohibited the naturalization of Chinese immigrants. The U.S. Supreme Court then extended the denial of naturalization rights to Japanese immigrants in the Ozawa case and to Asian Indian immigrants in U.S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind (1922). The Supreme Court ruled that being neither white nor black, Asians were ineligible to become citizens.

The anti-Japanese exclusion movement climaxed with congressional passage of the 1924 Immigration Act. One provision of this act prohibited the admission of aliens ineligible to citizenship as immigrants. This provision, based on the assumption of the racial inferiority and undesirability of Asians, abruptly halted all Japanese immigration to the United States. Events and time slowly changed us as a people, and Congress responded. Over the years Congress added more and more categories of people who could become citizens: Native Americans in 1924, Latin Americans in 1940, Chinese in 1943, Filipinos and Asian Indians in 1946, and finally Japanese and Koreans in 1952. In 1952 Congress finally amended the law to read: “The right of a person to become a naturalized citizen...shall not be denied or abridged because of race or sex or because such person is married.”

Minorities in their search for racial justice continue to work and learn from one another; national debate over proper levels of immigration or rates of acculturation in our society persists. Recent California ballot propositions limiting immigrant benefits and restricting the use of bilingual education invite intervention by the federal courts. The issues raised in the historical documents used in these lessons are very much alive, and the choices made by the courts in resolving these issues will help shape dramatically the world our students will experience.

Endnotes

1. Charles J. McClain, In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle against Discrimination in Nineteenth Century America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 2-4.

2. See also Fred Friendly and Martha J. H. Elliott, The Constitution, That Delicate Balance: Landmark Cases That Shaped the Constitution (New York: Random House, 1984). Chapter 14, “Give Me Your Tired and Hungry” develops more fully the dynamic between minorities and their struggle to gain acceptance and win full participation in American life.

Bibliography

Chuman, Frank. The Bamboo People. Del Mar, CA: Publishers Inc., 1976.

Corwin, Edward. The Constitution and What It Means Today. Rev. by Harold W. Chase and Craig R. Ducat. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. This is a most useful resource for teachers seeking to get a handle on particular passages of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court.

Davidson, James West and Mark Hamilton Lytle. After the Fact: The Art of Historical Detection. New York: Knopf, 1982.

Epstein, Lee and Thomas G. Walker. Constitutional Law For A Changing America: A Short Course. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996. Chapter 2, “Approaches to Supreme Court Decision Making,” is particularly helpful.

Friendly, Fred and Martha J. H. Elliott. The Constitution, That Delicate Balance: Landmark Cases That Shaped the Constitution. New York: Random House, 1984.

Garraty, John A., ed. Quarrels that Have Shaped the Constitution. New York: Harper and Row, 1987.

Hosokawa, Bill and Robert Wilson. East to America. New York: Morrow, 1980.

Ichioka, Yuji. The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants. New York: The Free Press, 1988.

Irons, Peter. The Courage of Their Convictions: Sixteen Americans Who Fought Their Way to the Supreme Court. New York: The Free Press, 1988.

McClain, Charles J. In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle against Discrimination in Nineteenth Century America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

Nash, Gary B. Red, White, and Black. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1982.

Takaki, Ronald. Issei and Nisei: The Settling of Japanese America. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1994. This book is an excellent short introduction to Japanese immigration and includes a terrific picture of the distinguished Takao Ozawa on page 87.

Steven C. Teel has taught United States history, American government, and Asian history at Berkeley High School in Berkeley, California for twenty-nine years.